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Abstract 
How Collaborative Synchrony Affects  
Humanization of Machines and Rehumanization of Humans 
Alina S. Larson 
Whether another person is perceived as similar or different from oneself can lead 
to differing impressions of their inherent human-like qualities (Haslam, 2006). As 
the boundaries between human-computer interaction and computer-mediated 
communication become increasingly fuzzy, it is important to assess in which 
ways these humanization measurements may also apply to non-human agents. 
There is evidence for interventions involving motion synchrony that can 
strengthen interpersonal bonds and perhaps instill a sense of similarity between 
individuals who otherwise have little in common (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009), 
but it is as yet unclear whether similar effects can be observed for interactions 
between human and non-human agents. In a series of three experiments, I 
investigate the effect of synchrony on interactions with machine agents in three 
health contexts (mental, physical, and social health), each designed to be 
successively more applicable to real-life interactions between humans and 
machines (using static robot therapists, a physical robot exercise coach, and then 
an anonymous on-line debate and a game-like activity with a supposedly human 
or machine addressee). Humanization ratings did correspond to robot preference, 
and participation in an optional mimicry task after the initial training did lead to 
more positive humanization scores for the robot that was designed to help, rather 
  vi 
than replace human therapists (Experiment 1). Synchronized stretching exercises 
resulted in warmer responses during interactions with a physical robot than non-
synchronous exercises (Experiment 2). People gave higher humanization ratings 
to supposedly human agents, and are more persuaded by synchrony with 
anonymous human agents or non-synchrony with machine agents (Experiment 3). 
This research provides evidence for the importance of synchrony and backstories 
in building positive interactions between humans and machine agents, as well as 
between humans and other humans in anonymized contexts. However, it is 
important to bear in mind that attitudes around the capabilities of machines as 
compared to humans can lead to different responses following synchrony 
exercises. For example, while participants are more persuaded by emotionally 
distant machine agents, non-threatening outgroup members receive greater 
humanization benefits from motion-matching activities.   
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How Collaborative Synchrony Affects 
Humanization of Machines and Rehumanization of Humans 
The prevalence of machines with increasingly humanlike interaction styles 
has given rise to questions and concerns over competition with robots for jobs and 
the threat of automation in the workforce. There is at least one social parallel in 
the fear of having to compete with machines or immigrants for jobs. To find ways 
to improve interpersonal relationships and promote intergroup empathy, it is 
helpful to study interactions with non-human agents as a proxy for human-human 
interactions. The study of human-robot interactions may tell us something that 
human-human interaction studies cannot. For example, participants might be 
more willing to discuss prejudices against machines than against people in survey 
responses. I have developed a program of research in order to better understand 
which situational factors (internal and external) promote the perception of illusory 
personhood and self-identification with machines, with the hope that these 
findings may be extended to prejudice reduction in human-human interactions as 
well.  
Previous research suggests that promoting a sense of similarity between 
individuals can result in more positive interactions and intergroup empathy, 
whether that similarity is based on internal or external characteristics. The more 
similar to the user, helpful, and humanlike an agent is described as being in a 
given backstory, the more the user enjoys the interaction and respects their 
feedback, even when the user knows they are interacting with a lifeless computer 
(Nass & Brave, 2005). The more people act in synchrony with one another in 
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external activities, through rhythmic (even joyless) behavior-matching and 
collaborative motion, the more they identify as team members and the better they 
perform in cooperative tasks (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). I aim to discover 
whether impressions of an agent’s internal characteristics and cooperation with 
them can be altered by manipulating the external behavior of a machine agent 
(using motion synchrony), even when their backstory presents their internal 
characteristics in a more negative light (as less similar to the identity of the 
participant). 
In this introduction, I will first discuss how people form first impressions 
of personality through multimodal cues, and how they use these biased 
impressions to make dehumanizing judgments. Next, I will explore human-
computer interactions and how it is that people come to see machines as social 
agents and even as humanlike, and what factors contribute to increased 
humanization of inanimate machine agents. Finally, I will examine the many 
factors that play into human-human communication and getting thoughts across 
through auditory and visual language – how people speak to benefit their listener 
– and will discuss some synchrony exercises that may improve intergroup 
relations. 
Impression Formation 
         Much of human communication goes well beyond language. Even before 
we come in contact with someone in face-to-face conversation, we can already 
start to form impressions of their character. People are capable of making snap 
judgments to determine whether someone is human or not, a friend or not. These 
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dispositional attributions may contribute to predictions that prove very useful for 
survival, but can also serve to reinforce a sense of self versus other and us versus 
them that in turn produces stereotype, stigma, and intergroup tension.  
However, while impression formation may be adaptive in certain 
circumstances (life or death), this comes at some cost to accuracy. Working to 
better understand how dispositional thinking takes root in first impressions may 
allow us to be better aware of our own biases in order to have clearer 
communication with others and mutually beneficial interactions. In this review, I 
take into consideration the various multimodal cues that factor into person 
perception and intergroup stigma as well as ways to counter these biases and 
prejudices. 
        In the following section, I will first discuss how person perception is prone 
to inherent biases that are context-dependent and formed very quickly. Next, I 
will describe two major forms of dehumanization that can result from these 
character impressions – animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization – and how 
these two types of dehumanization are used to characterize and stereotype liberals 
and conservatives respectively. Finally, I will discuss potential methods to disrupt 
the process of negative impression formation and to increase intergroup empathy. 
Bias-Prone Impressions 
         Knowing who may pose a potential threat to one’s own survival is a 
highly adaptive skill, and it is clear that humans excel at doing just this, even with 
very limited visual cues to work from. In a study designed to see just how fast a 
person could judge a neutral expression for certain qualities, with accuracy 
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measured by a comparison to judgements made by other participants after a 
longer exposure, researchers found that participants could decide in 39 
milliseconds whether a face was threatening (Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006). However, 
participants were not able to judge the same faces for intelligence in this amount 
of time. The authors conclude that perhaps having an understanding of threat 
takes priority over certain other qualities. That, or intelligence may be more 
difficult to identify, even from stereotypes. 
         These snap judgments also extend to the world of politics, as demonstrated 
in a study designed to determine how the appearance of political candidates 
factored into their electoral success (Olivola & Todorov, 2010). The researchers 
found that perceived facial competence was by far the strongest predictor of 
election success (for both hypothetical and actual votes), even controlling for 
other facial features that were highly correlated with competence itself. The 
authors were also able to construct a computational model of face-based 
competence judgments in order to derive specific facial features associated with 
competence, which is clearly rooted in subtle, visual cues (such as facial 
angularity, brow height). The authors found that such subtle cues can lead 
participants to cast a vote after only 100 ms of viewing a facial stimulus for a 
given politician (regardless of that candidate’s actual competence score). Enough 
of these snap judgments could indeed determine the results of an election – a 
sobering thought. 
         It is clear that visual cues such as apparent facial competence may play a 
role in the election of our leaders, and there is also evidence that visual cues play 
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a role in the selection of subordinates. In a mock interview study, a participant's 
judgments and hiring decisions were shaped by whether a female interviewee 
demonstrated a dynamic, authentic smile, as opposed to a dynamic and fake 
smile, or a neutral expression (Krumhuber, Manstead, Cosker, Marshall, & Rosin, 
2008). These dynamic and authentic smiles lead to more favorable job, person, 
and expression ratings for both human and synthetic expressions. Female 
interviewees performing these expressions were also more likely to be short-listed 
and selected for the job in both human and synthetic face experiments. These 
results make a clear case that these visual cues are so fundamental to our 
impression formation of others that it is worth investigating whether they extend 
to humanoid machine agents as well. 
         As for other visual features that can be assessed quickly, some have found 
that race (Black/White) can be assessed in as little as 100 ms, and gender 
(Male/Female) can be assessed after only 150 ms of stimulus onset (Ito & Urland, 
2003). Acoustic features may also factor into attributional inferences. For 
example, high and intermediate subjective measurements of loudness and 
resonance of voice are associated with higher vocal attractiveness for male and 
female voices, although objective spectrogram measures that could predict vocal 
attractiveness for male voices failed to do so for female voices (Zuckerman & 
Miyake, 1993).  
It is clear that subtle multimodal cues can play a large role in the 
formation of first impressions. These features can be assessed from recordings, 
photographs, and can be made in milliseconds. It is likely that group 
  6 
categorization and quick assessment of others have played some role in the 
survival of our predecessors, but the question is: how much of the time can these 
impressions that are made so quickly, off of such impoverished information, be 
accurate? 
         Something to consider when evaluating first impression accuracy is 
whether someone has the same impression of another person, regardless of that 
person's mood in the present moment. In one study, researchers examined this 
question by having participants come into a lab to rate five photographs each of 
twenty people in order to see if there was within-individual variation in 
impression formation. The authors demonstrated that snapshots of dynamic facial 
expressions can lead to wildly different impressions, with participants more likely 
to be consistent with other participants for a specific image than with themselves 
for the same face making different expression (Todorov & Porter, 2014). 
Additionally, the authors demonstrated that preferences for a given face were also 
different in different contexts (online dating as opposed to mayoral elections). 
This finding is further evidence that the context of an introduction and the 
expression of a face when one first sees it can alter dispositional attributions one 
makes. 
         Once biased impressions take shape, they can be difficult to shake. In one 
study of group categorization and disclosure, participants listened to an audio 
recording where a male speaker disclosed his sexual orientation either early or 
late in the recording (Buck & Plant, 2010). Male participants who heard the 
speaker disclose their orientation as gay earlier in the recording responded with 
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more negative and avoidant behaviors than those who heard the disclosure later in 
the monologue. The recorded voice who disclosed as gay was met with more 
prejudice overall than that of the same voice who disclosed as straight, though 
there was a clear primacy effect for sexual disclosure prejudice. In other words, 
higher level of bias occurs when minority-group categorization occurs before 
individuating information. Initial impressions carried greater weight in ongoing 
character analysis. 
         It is also important to ask how the visual context surrounding a judgment 
might work to influence the type of attributions made. In another experiment, 
student mock jurors viewed one of three videotapes of the same mock 
interrogation, resulting in a confession by the suspect (Lassiter & Irvine, 1986). In 
the suspect-focus group (where the suspect was in full view of the camera), 
students could recognize a small degree of coercion used by the detective, but 
made more dispositional attributions of the suspect than in the other two groups. 
In the detective-focus group, students noticed a large degree of coercion, and 
made the fewest dispositional attributions of the suspect. The third angle, filmed 
from the side, such that suspect and detective were in equal-focus, allowed 
moderate recognition of coercive behaviors on the detective's part. 
         In order to validate the findings in this initial study, as well as to challenge 
aspects of it that could fall under critique, a number of replication studies were 
performed. In four additional experiments, the authors concluded that the equal-
focus angle was the least biased camera angle, and that people are still prone to 
camera-angle bias even when they are aware of the impact of viewing angles, or 
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when told to focus more on the evidence provided in a case (with likelihood of 
guilty verdicts and term sentences increasing as the camera angle focused from 
detective to suspect). This perceptual-level bias, which the authors describe as a 
form of mental contamination seems difficult to override and prevents 
participants from noticing coercive techniques used by the interrogator (Lassiter, 
Beers, Geers, Handley, Munhall, & Wiland, 2002). 
         Another couple of attempts were made in more ecologically valid 
contexts, but neither a realistic video of a trial re-enactment nor intensive judicial 
instruction of mock jurors were able to eliminate the influence of camera angle on 
a mock juror's final verdict (Lassiter, Geers, Handley, Weiland, & Munhall, 
2002). The authors recommend equal-focus or detective-focus camera angles for 
interrogation footage, which has a tendency to allow viewers to pick up on 
coercion more effectively. 
         In summary, the literature suggests that many subtle cues related to a 
person's appearance, their placement within a scene, as well as the timing of 
information presentation can have lasting effects on attributions made about 
another individual. These judgments, in turn, can have life-or-death consequences 
for the individuals under scrutiny, as in the cases of actual courtroom verdicts 
made by jurors. 
Dehumanization 
        Dispositional impressions formed in the ways described above might in 
turn lead to dehumanizing characterizations of a perceived individual. 
Dehumanization is thought to take one of two major forms (Haslam, 2006). The 
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first form is that of animalistic dehumanization, denying the subject their 
fundamental traits of human uniqueness, such as reasoning capability, maturity, 
moral sensibility, refinement and civility. The second form is that of mechanistic 
dehumanization, denying the subject fundamental traits of human nature, such as 
emotional capability, warm and deep interaction capability, open mindedness, and 
agency. 
 A number of factors can affect whether or not dehumanization occurs. In a 
series of experiments, researchers compared the effect of communication medium 
(written as compared to spoken, and later compared to synthesized speech) and 
agreement (whether the participant agreed or disagreed with the communicator) 
on perceptions of their interlocutors (Schroeder, Kardas, & Epley, 2017). When 
participants agreed with their interlocutors, communication medium did not have 
consistent effects on humanization ratings of communicators. However, in cases 
of disagreement, communicators who spoke were rated much more favorably than 
those who communicated the same information via written text. These results 
clearly indicate that contexts with written as compared to spoken word and where 
participants disagree with their interlocutor on the topic of communication can 
lead to lower ratings of human uniqueness and human nature qualities. In 
Experiment 3 of the present research, participants are set up to dehumanize an 
interlocutor in order to stage an intervention. All participants read text that is 
selected to be at odds with their own opinion. The fact that the text is read rather 
than spoken, and that the interlocutor is in disagreement with them will help to 
ensure that participants begin to think of the addressee as an outgroup member. 
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In terms of humanization subscales, it is interesting to note that the authors 
observed reduced effects of communication medium on human nature as 
compared to human uniqueness ratings across all experiments (Schroeder, Kardas, 
& Epley, 2017). They suggest that this could be a result of spoken language 
leading to judgements on thinking and cognition (human uniqueness) more than 
emotion and feeling (human nature). In my own research, since all participants in 
Experiment 3 are exposed to written (rather than spoken) language that disagrees 
with their own argument, I will not be so concerned with these comparisons, but it 
is interesting to see how different cues can give rise to different attributions along 
the two humanization subscales. Human uniqueness and human nature 
characteristics can manifest differently in different contexts and can have social 
consequences when first impressions become lasting impressions. 
         These two forms of dehumanization have a demonstrated a role in partisan 
politics. In a Mechanical Turk experiment, participants were asked to rate liberals 
and conservatives for positive and negative human uniqueness and nature traits. 
Next, participants were asked to identify their own political ideology. Human 
uniqueness and nature traits were associated with conservatives and liberals 
respectively (Crawford, Modri, & Motyl, 2013). That is, conservatives associated 
with terms related to reasoning, but not emotionality (mechanistically 
dehumanized) while liberals were associated with emotionality, but not reasoning 
(animalistically dehumanized). Additionally, more positive descriptors were 
applied to the participant's own political party (in-group), while more negative 
descriptors were applied to the opposing party (out-group). 
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         In another study of political identity and dehumanization, researchers 
found that the more strongly participants identified with a political ingroup, the 
more they would dehumanize an outgroup (Pacilli, Roccato, Pagliaro, & Russo, 
2015). Not only are people likely to apply negative animalistic or mechanistic 
labels to an outgroup, but they will also apply positive human uniqueness and 
nature traits to their own group, and the more strongly they associate with this 
ingroup, the more they will consider the outgroup to be less than human. While it 
may seem hopeless to expect to counter these snap judgments that people make, 
there are some areas where potential interventions might prove effective that I 
will discuss in the next section. 
Potential Interventions 
         While uncommon, it seems that people are able to impose critical thought 
that is independent of first impressions when they are asked to do so. In a mock 
trial study, arguments for and against the defendant's claim to innocence were 
presented to a participant (Tetlock, 1983). The presentation order for pro/con 
arguments varied, as did the participant's requirement to justify their decision or 
not, and whether they were asked to justify their decision before or after reading 
the arguments. Participants who received the arguments against the defendant first 
(con/pro) were more likely to perceive the defendant as guilty than those 
receiving arguments in favor of the defendant first (pro/con). However, order of 
argument presentation made no difference when participants were asked to justify 
their decisions before viewing the arguments.  
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Others have demonstrated that facial competence cues only impact 
election success for the less knowledgeable voters, with no impact on highly 
knowledgeable voters (Olivola & Todorov, 2010). The more situational 
knowledge a person has, and the more they are encouraged to think critically, the 
less influence dispositional cues have in final judgment. Becoming more 
knowledgeable can take the form of exposure to others different from oneself. 
There is evidence to suggest that intergroup contact with others from 
diverse backgrounds can help bolster empathy and lead to reductions in prejudice 
between groups. In a discussion of intergroup contact theory, some researchers 
postulate that there is an inverse relationship between intergroup contact and 
prejudice, and that familiarity does indeed have a tendency to increase liking 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Other researchers have also proposed a theoretical 
model to help explain individual differences in punitiveness. These researchers 
have demonstrated an inverse relationship between empathy and harsh 
punishment, as people are more punitive towards those they don't empathize and 
identify with (Unnever & Cullen, 2009). Taken together, these theoretical models 
would suggest that in order to foster empathy and goodwill between groups, we 
would do best to encourage intergroup contact whenever possible.  
Some researchers did indeed recommend intergroup contact as a method 
to reduce or overcome dehumanization (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Another 
recommendation they alluded to was that of promoting a superordinate identity, 
and focusing on similarities shared between subgroups. The authors lamented the 
fact that dehumanization reduction is under-researched. This could, in part, be due 
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to the difficulty of ethically setting participants up to exhibit dehumanizing 
behaviors, in order to create ecologically valid settings to study the reduction of 
such behaviors. Such a design could potentially exacerbate existing behaviors, or 
lead participants to feel uncomfortable responding honestly within an experiment. 
In the context of my research, intergroup contact takes the form of a 
collaborative synchrony or mimicry exercise, and common identity is established 
by way of backstory (telling people they will be interacting with another student, 
as compared to a machine learning algorithm). By comparing dehumanization 
between machine agents, or between a so-called human versus machine, I hope to 
investigate possible interventions with machines as proxies for humans. For this 
to work, it is important that machine agents can be seen as outgroup members 
(subordinate or threatening to humans, leading to dehumanization). 
Simultaneously, it is important that people are able to attribute humanlike 
characteristics to these machines (leading to humanization). 
         Machine agents can be seen as outgroup members. In a mail-in survey, 
participants from Northern California were asked to what extent they believed 
computers were capable of performing physical and psychological tasks usually 
assigned to humans, and whether computers could potentially fill routine, 
interpretive or personal occupations. Participants responded with an 
anthropocentric perspective – believing that robots should not fill roles 
traditionally held by people – more when they had either limited experience with 
other cultures, a lower level of education, or both (Nass, Lombard, Henriksen, & 
Steuer, 1995). It is possible that negative impressions of robots go beyond their 
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actual limitations, and have more to do with the perception of threat that comes 
with less exposure to diverse populations.  
Machine agents can also be seen as humanlike. In another survey study, 
asking participants about preferred occupations for robots, people indicated a 
preference for collaborative, as compared to competitive robot workers 
(Takayama, Ju, & Nass, 2008). It is likely when robots are positioned as taking on 
the tasks traditionally assigned to humans, people begin to think of these robots as 
threatening, and even as outgroup members. Perhaps an increased exposure to 
robots could carry with it a greater understanding of computer capabilities and 
reduce the sense of threat that some feel. 
         In sum, the body of literature on impression formation seems to indicate 
that presentation context has a large impact on how people engage with and judge 
other people, as well as on in-group and out-group categorization. In the next 
section, I discuss ways in which computers, robots, and other embodied agents 
can be subject to similar judgments. 
Illusory Agency in Human-Computer Interactions 
         It is clear that humans are experts at formulating character impressions of 
other people, if not always consistently across contexts. As machine technology 
improves by leaps and bounds, and it becomes easier for humans to make use of 
smart devices, the distinction between what is human and what is machine 
becomes fuzzier. Consequently, people begin to ascribe humanlike characteristics 
to otherwise non-conscious objects, such as a smart home device that can hold up 
a semi-scripted conversation with them, and follow simple instructions. This in 
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turn can lead users to agentify these objects and imbue them with a certain 
perceived consciousness. That is to say, people may be in some ways tricked into 
thinking of machines as real people (effectively humanizing them) even while 
they are aware that they are interacting with mindless machines. 
         In the next section, I will start off by describing a series of experiments 
that document ways in which humans begin to treat machines, or computers, as 
social agents. I will then discuss how the effect of agentifying machines becomes 
even stronger when the machine is made to more closely resemble the human it is 
interacting with. Finally, I discuss the power of belief: how thinking of an agent 
as human or machine is enough to change how people choose to interact with 
another agent, even if they are in actuality no different from one another. 
Machines as Social Agents 
 Even while knowingly interacting with machines, people have a tendency 
to treat robots as something between subject and object. Because robots straddle 
the line between an animate other and an inanimate thing, it is unclear as to 
whether they are thought of as having a mind or consciousness. Various 
experiments have been conducted by Nass and colleagues to study the tendency 
that people have of treating machines as social agents, while simultaneously 
denying them personhood (Nass & Brave, 2005). For example, one study made 
use of text-to-speech (TTS) synthesized voices, a type of computer-generated 
speech. Participants were asked to listen to five book reviews produced either by 
five different TTS voices (of different pitch, timbre), or just one TTS voice for all 
five reviews. When participants heard all five different voices, the speakers were 
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rated as more socially present and the books were given higher ratings as well 
(Nass & Moon, 2000). These effects persisted even if the experimenters carefully 
informed participants of what TTS speech was, how it was produced, and 
informed them that none of the voices were in fact reflective of actual human 
speakers. 
         In another study, when participants received flattering (as opposed to 
generic) feedback from a human or synthesized speaker while playing a trivia 
game, flattery boosted ratings of the synthesized speaker’s social attractiveness 
for synthetic speech but not recorded human speech (Lee, 2010). Interestingly, 
human voices only received received slightly higher anthropomorphism scores 
than synthesized speech. Simply hearing a synthesized voice is enough to amplify 
ratings of social attractiveness and believability of the computer. Still, one might 
expect a visual representation of a machine to clearly demonstrate to its audience 
that it is not in fact a conscious living creature, and need not be treated as such. 
         In an experiment involving a multimodal virtual agent, PERSONAGE, 
researchers sought to understand if the frequency and performance of gestures 
would impact a virtual agent's rated extraversion (Neff, Wang, Abbott, & Walker, 
2010). Indeed, increased rate of gestures as well as a more dynamic performance 
of gestures were both associated with an increase in perceived extraversion. If 
people think of a virtual agent as nothing more than the result of algorithms, with 
no actual identity or self, dynamic gestures should carry no social importance 
whatsoever. It would seem that a visible robot is not enough to dispel users of the 
illusion of agency. 
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 Understanding what cues robots can make use of in establishing their 
agency is becoming increasingly important as robots become more and more 
ubiquitous. In one study, researchers brought a robotic baby seal named Paro into 
a nursing home. Paro’s activity generated a good deal of conversation both about 
the robot as an object, and towards the robot as an interlocutor (Taggart, Turkle, 
& Kidd, 2005). When residents addressed Paro itself, they often spoke to it as 
they would a pet, and many expressed a belief that Paro could experience 
emotional states. When the robot was switched off, rendering it a fully inert 
object, the conversations with researchers were noticeably less chatty, as residents 
spoke and gestured less. If Paro can be treated as an emotional entity in such a 
context, nursing home residents who otherwise have limited access to social 
interactions may benefit tremendously from the presence of such a robotic agent. 
Relational agents, such as robots like Paro, are designed to fostering long-
term emotional and social connections with their users. In one study, researchers 
created a humanoid animated agent, either relational or non-relational, in order to 
determine the impact of having a social and emotional connection with a virtual 
agent in the context of behavior change coaching for exercise (Bickmore & 
Picard, 2005). The researchers found that interacting with a relational virtual 
training coach led to better user impressions and desire to continue training with 
the agent, as well as more emotional responses in conversation with the agent, as 
compared to the non-relational agent. 
There are clear advantages to using machines that encourage users to 
engage in conversation, or even healthful physical activity. As robots become 
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more abundant and affordable, this may allow everyone to have their own 
personal training coach and companion. Another study made use of a NAO robot 
(a small robot with a humanlike body) and designed a motivational interview to 
encourage participants to talk about themselves and their behaviors without fear 
of judgement or interruption. Participants reported feeling more comfortable 
divulging sensitive information and being honest with the robot (Galvão Gomes 
da Silva et al., 2018).  If robots can encourage more honest self-disclosure, 
perhaps this will allow people to be more honest with themselves, by extension. 
Another place robots may be able to make a positive impact on people’s 
lives is in therapy. While robots may never be as nice to talk to as other people 
(Larson & Fox Tree, in review), there are some cases where having a robot 
therapist may be better than an alternative of having no one to talk to. Machine 
agents that communicate via text might provide an avenue for social interaction 
and support for individuals who either don’t feel comfortable disclosing their 
emotions to another person, or who cannot afford to see a human therapist. A 
study on the conversational agent Woebot found that, compared to an eBook 
resource on depression, conversations with this chat bot significantly reduced 
symptoms of depression in users as reported in a follow-up survey (Fitzpatrick, 
Darcy, & Vierhile, 2017). 
Robots may work well as personal training coaches, therapists, maybe 
even doctors, but these interactions are more complicated than a simple human-
object interaction, and may begin to take on more social elements. After 
completing a task on one computer, people give consistently higher ratings on the 
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performance of this computer when they are asked to fill out an evaluation on that 
particular computer, as compared to when they are asked to fill out an evaluation 
on a second computer or on a printed survey (Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999). 
While people all claimed that they would have responded similarly regardless of 
how the survey was administered, and yet it seems that they unconsciously treated 
the machine they interacted with with more politeness, almost as if it were a 
thinking and feeling agent. 
         Behaviors related to politeness can also indicate a certain degree of respect 
and comfort with a machine agent. In a robot study, proxemics (approach 
distances) were used as a measure of user comfort in interacting with a machine 
(Walters, Syrdal, Koay, Dautenhahn, & te Boekhorst, 2008). The robot's voice 
was either a male, female, or non-gendered neutral synthesized voice, or the voice 
of the human experimenter. Though approach distances were closer (indicating 
greater comfort) for the human experimenter's voice condition, the fact that 
participants left a good deal of space between themselves and the machine is 
possibly indicative of the fact that they had respect for the robot's space. 
Robots may prove useful as tools for behavioral change, especially 
considering the social effects of chat with machine agents, attachments formed 
with a particular machine, and interactions with physically embodied and 
conversational machine agents. People have been shown to think of robots less 
like simple objects and more like pets, or maybe even companions. In one study 
on a mechanical ottoman footstool, researchers found that participants interacted 
with the robotic chair as they would with a pet, or an object, but often a bit of both 
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(Sirkin, Mok, Yang, & Ju, 2015). Additionally, participants used agentive 
language to describe what the ottoman might want as a way of explaining its 
behavior. The researchers used a Wizard of Oz design (with a human confederate 
acting as the machine), where an experimenter was in reality controlling the 
ottoman via remote control from another room. While most participants correctly 
suspected the chair was teleoperated, many of them still ascribed desires, volition, 
and agency to the chair itself. Some participants were so taken in by the illusion 
of life that they didn't feel comfortable placing their feet on the ottoman and 
treating it like an object. Because it acted like it had a life of its own, participants 
felt that it deserved better treatment than that.  
Similarity Attraction 
         There is another clear trend in the human-computer interaction literature: 
people prefer to interact with machines that display similar, and sometimes 
complementary characteristics to their own personality and to humans in general. 
This, of course, harkens back to the ever-relevant uncanny valley hypothesis 
(Mori, MacDorman, & Kageki, 2012). That is to say, people appreciate objects 
and feel affinity for them more as they come to approach a human likeness for the 
most part, with the exception of a certain drop in affinity as an object approaches 
(but doesn't quite) appear human. For example, objects such as prosthetic limbs 
would fall into this region; they resemble a human in appearance quite closely, 
almost enough to be mistaken for a true human appendage at first glance, but are 
simultaneously not close enough to appear human. If an object is humanlike, but 
misses the mark, it may be considered eerie or unnatural. It is likely that the 
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uncanny valley is different for people of different cultural and life experiences, 
with some finding a given robot or device creepy and others seeing it as perfectly 
normal, depending on how that technology is portrayed in the media and how 
common it is. 
         In a similar vein to research with agent voices, one study on virtual 
embodied agents found that participants respond more socially to less embodied 
computer agents. Participants were either told they were interacting with an avatar 
controlled by a human, or that they were interacting with a computer agent in a 
three-dimensional environment (Nowak & Biocca, 2004). Additionally, they were 
shown either a high-anthropomorphic or low-anthropomorphic image (that is, 
appearing as an artificial human face or simply a mouth and eyes), or no image. 
Participants responded socially, reporting a high level of social presence 
(connection: being able to assess partner’s reactions and feeling like it was a face-
to-face meeting) for both human and computer partners, more so for low-
anthropomorphic than no image or high-anthropomorphic images. Furthermore, 
the virtual image improved the perception of telepresence (of feeling immersed in 
the virtual environment), but more so with the low-anthropomorphic than high-
anthropomorphic avatar/agent again. Perhaps the high-anthropomorphic faces 
were close, but not close enough to human to elicit favorable responses, which 
was why a disembodied mouth outperformed the face for social connection and 
telepresence. 
         Another experiment used videos of robots (of different appearances and 
behavioral styles) to lend empirical support to the uncanny valley hypothesis. In 
  22 
this experiment, the researchers demonstrated that people do generally respond 
more positively to robots with more humanlike appearance and attributes 
(Walters, Syrdal, Dautenhahn, te Boekhorst, & Koay, 2008). That is to say, robots 
with facial features received the highest ratings for extraversion, emotional 
stability, conscientiousness, agreeableness and intelligence. There was one 
exception to this finding: introverted participants and those with lower emotional 
stability preferred the more mechanical robots to a greater extent than did other 
participants. Nevertheless, when machine agents lack facial features, it is clear 
that most people prefer the machine to look and act more human. 
         In this discussion of preference for self-similar machines, it is always 
important to remember that individual and group differences in preference do 
exist, and in fact are interesting demonstrations of which communities may indeed 
benefit the most from the use of certain technological innovations. Another study 
attempted to delve into group differences in preferences for human versus 
synthesized singing voices (Kuriki, Tamura, Igarashi, Kato, & Nakano, 2016). 
The two groups were participants with and without a diagnosis for Autism 
Spectrum Disorder. While autistic and non-autistic groups described the music 
they heard in similar terms, the autistic group rated human and synthesized 
singing voices more similarly for naturalness, animatedness, and emotion, even 
while noting that the human voice was more humanlike. The autistic group did 
not display the clear preference for the human voice that the non-autistic group 
did.  
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         In another similarity-attraction study, dominant or submissive computer 
agents were randomly matched to dominant or submissive participants (Nass, 
Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 1995). Without knowing their own dominant or 
submissive personality score, participants preferred the computer personality that 
matched their own. Another study demonstrated that people responded positively 
to a change in the computer's behavior over time, when that change was in the 
direction of increasing similarity to their own dominant or submissive personality 
(Moon & Nass, 1996). This would indicate that, for at least dominant and 
submissive traits, users prefer machines to portray similar personality 
characteristics to themselves. 
         In another book review study – this time with voices designed to sound 
introverted or extroverted – introvert and extrovert participants demonstrated 
strong similarity attraction (Nass & Lee, 2000). Participants rated the reviewer as 
well as the book review, and in both cases tended to prefer those with a TTS voice 
matched to their own introversion/extraversion level. A matched TTS voice was 
rated as more attractive, credible, and informative. 
         However, in a more interactive study with a visual and textual virtual 
agent, the stronger effect was that of complementary attraction (Isbister & Nass, 
2000). Introverted and extraverted participants were either matched to a virtual 
agent's visual cues (posture), verbal cues (text), both, or neither. Next, they 
completed the Desert Survival Problem, ranking the most important items for 
desert survival with input from an animated virtual partner. Participants exhibited 
a preference for consistent characters (with self-consistent audio-visual cues 
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indicating either introversion or extraversion) with a personality complementary, 
not identical, to their own. Though this finding seems contradictory to previous 
findings (supporting similarity-attraction), it is perhaps the interactive nature of 
the task and the goal of the task that gave rise to a complementary preference, 
with the goal of the Desert Survival task yielding advantages for diverse 
viewpoints, while a complementary perspective on a book review may be less 
useful. 
         In another study, an embodied virtual agent was coded to use big 
sweeping extraverted gestures, or constricted introverted gestures during different 
segments of a story, either moving from introverted to extroverted, or extroverted 
to introverted gestural styles over time (Tolins, Liu, Neff, Walker & Fox Tree, 
2016). Participants who had scored high or low on the Big 5 personality test for 
extraversion–introversion listened to the embodied agent tell a story with these 
extraverted and introverted gestures, and then were asked to repeat back the same 
story segment to the agent. The gestures of the participants were recorded and 
transcribed, then compared to the gestural style of the agent they interacted with. 
Highly extraverted participants were more responsive to the agent’s changing 
gestures, and would use big sweeping gestures when the agent switched to using 
smaller gestures, indicating that divergence, rather than convergence, may be at 
play in these interpersonal interactions. Perhaps the participants were shifting to a 
complementary style in order to better engage with their embodied interlocutor. 
         Whether it is important for a computer agent to display features similar or 
complementary to one's own, it is clear that most people prefer said agent to be 
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more humanlike than robotic, at least up to a point. Whether this preference is 
based on a logical desire for more common ground and mutual understanding 
with an interlocutor, or on sheer prejudice against outgroup members or those 
dissimilar to oneself is unclear. It remains an important area of inquiry in the 
study of human-computer interaction, and something I seek to better understand 
through my own research.  
Backstories 
         While people can begin to treat machines as social agents, there remains a 
clear bias to favor humans over machines. In a discourse analysis experiment, 
participants were either told they were having a text-based conversation with a 
human next-door or a computer program while working together to solve the 
Desert Survival Problem (Schectman & Horowitz, 2003). When they believed 
they were communicating with a human partner, participants acted more like they 
would in establishing a relationship, as compared to when speaking with a 
presumed machine partner. For example, they spent more time writing longer 
comments to supposedly human partners than machine partners, and also used 
more relationship statements. Even though no difference actually existed between 
human and machine partners, the perception of one as being human made a big 
difference in communicative displays. 
         In a similarly deceptive study, participants were told that a computer-
animated character they were interacting with in a social dilemma or negotiation 
game was either a human avatar or a computer agent (de Melo, Gratch, & 
Carnevale, 2014). When participants believed they were interacting with a human 
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rather than a computer, they were less hostile – more polite – towards their virtual 
partner, reported more positive impressions of them (an average of fairness, 
trustworthiness, cooperativeness, and likability). They were also more likely to 
concede to their partner in an argument than when the partner was perceived to be 
a computer agent. In other words, thinking that they were interacting with an 
actual human led participants to behave in more sociable ways. While people may 
treat computers as agents in many ways that seem illogical, perceived human 
partners still get better treatment. 
         Another study using the Desert Survival Problem manipulated displays of 
humor by a virtual partner, which participants were told was either a human or a 
computer (Morkes, Kernal, & Nass, 1998). Participants gave their so-called 
human partner higher ratings for humor, and also smiled and laughed more than 
when interacting with a so-called computer partner. Again, it would seem that 
believing that an interlocutor is human leads to more social displays than 
believing that an interlocutor is machine. 
         In another study, labeling an interviewer as human or computer was 
enough to alter the participant's (here, mock interviewee's) responses during a 
web-based mock job interview (Aharoni & Fridlund, 2007). Participants smiled 
more and filled more silences with human than machine interviewers, even while 
subjective reports of emotional reactions were seemingly unaffected by human-
status of the interviewer. It is likely that the smiles displayed for human (as 
opposed to machine) interviewers was less a result of happier emotions and more 
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a communicative tool to benefit the conversational partner, as they did not 
correspond to higher subjective ratings of happiness. 
         All in all, there are clear signs that people will respond to machines 
socially, and generally seem to prefer computer agents that look and act more 
humanlike. Still, regardless of how computer agents act, the knowledge that they 
are not human is an impediment to their ability to be seen as social actors. As 
computers continue to gain humanlike abilities and take on human 
responsibilities, it will be important to discuss how they are perceived and treated 
as similar to or different from humans. In order to work harmoniously alongside 
often humanlike machines, there will be times where people may begin to 
embrace machines as members of their own ingroup, as team members and 
colleagues or even friends. 
Spontaneous Communication 
         Spontaneous communication in humans is a multimodal phenomenon, 
involving not only verbal cues, but also visual cues. Moreover, these cues and 
linguistic signals are not performed solely for the benefit of the speaker in 
transmitting a message clearly and accurately, but for the benefit of the listener. 
The way in which the interlocutor is perceived will have an impact on the 
methods employed by the speaker to establish common ground (Clark, 1996). 
Whether a speaker feels they have properly synced with their conversation partner 
will impact their impressions of this interlocutor as a conscious and thinking 
agent. This in turn can potentially lead to more positive interactions. Certain joint 
activities and communication styles may produce more synchronous and 
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empathetic interactions, with the potential to boost a sense of ingroup 
membership. 
         In this section, I begin by describing the imperfections of auditory and 
visual communication, explaining how their use in conjunction with one another 
can make up for the inherent ambiguities of each alone (an argument for studying 
both visual and auditory cues together, rather than separately). In the next 
subsection, I summarize how various characteristics of communication – 
including gestures, pragmatic markers, and fillers – are used as much for the 
benefit of the listener as they are for the speaker themself. I discuss ways in which 
these cues may be used in human-computer interaction as well. Finally, I describe 
ways in which people begin to match the behavior of an interlocutor – through 
motion synchrony – and how this may be beneficial for intergroup relations. 
Multimodal Ambiguity 
         Both visual and auditory cues can be ambiguous, which is why it is 
important to study how they work in conjunction with one another. In an audio-
only study of sarcasm, participants could differentiate posed sarcasm from non-
sarcasm using verbal cues, but could not distinguish between spontaneous 
sarcasm and non-sarcasm (Rockwell, 2000). Sometimes, even in human-human 
interactions, verbal cues are not enough to convey real, intended meaning. 
         Although the focus of psycholinguistics is usually on the verbal aspects of 
spoken communication, it is clear that visual cues also play a role. In an fMRI 
study, an actor spoke sentences while either facing the camera or to the side, and 
gesturing or not (Nagels, Kircher, Steines, & Straube, 2015). Participants felt 
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most addressed when the speaker was facing them and using gestures, which 
consequently led to the greatest activity of the anterior cingulate cortex (an area 
associated with mentalizing) and the left fusiform gyrus (also previously found to 
respond to body orientations). This experiment demonstrates clearly that not only 
are gestures important for a listener, but body-orientation also plays a role in 
whether the listener feels addressed or not. 
         Also, a study of facial expressions found higher accuracy for posed rather 
than natural expression identification, which sometimes fell below chance levels 
(Motley & Camden, 1988). Because of cases of ambiguity like this, it is important 
for a speaker to use all the audio-visual cues they can muster in order to convey a 
message that will be interpreted with the intended sentiment and meaning. If 
humans are not perfect at this, it is hard to imagine that computer algorithms and 
artificial intelligence will be able to do much better in communicating in a 
humanlike way. Still, with the improvement of machine learning tools, this is no 
longer an impossibility, so it is important to consider which communicative 
signals robots should be trained on to better recognize. 
         Certain speech behaviors may be performed primarily for the benefit of 
the listener. Visual cues such as gestures as well as verbal cues such as fillers, 
discourse markers, and hedges all play a role in keeping the listener both engaged 
and on the same page, especially in light of the fact that visual and auditory cues 
can be misinterpreted so easily. 
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Cues to Benefit the Listener 
         One clear example of a speech cue for the benefit of the listener is taken 
from a study on communication between blind and sighted participants, where 
they engaged in four Piegetian conservation tasks, describing the quantity, length, 
number and mass of water that was moved into various containers (Iverson & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2001). Sighted participants gestured to the blind participants, 
which indicates that gestures may indeed be self-serving. However, all of the 
blind participants did in fact make use gestures while communicating with sighted 
listeners. One might have expected that congenitally blind speakers would see no 
benefit in using gestures for their own speech production, but in so doing they 
effectively demonstrated that gestures may serve a greater purpose than simply 
aiding speech production. 
         In another study concerning the visibility and presence of an interlocutor, 
participants' gestures were recorded in face-to-face dialogue, telephone dialogue, 
or a monologue to a tape recorder (Bavelas, Gerwing, Sutton, & Prevost, 2007). 
Both the visibility and presence of a conversational partner had an effect on the 
rate of gesturing, with face-to-face yielding the highest rates of natural gestures, 
telephone being the second highest (though gestures were small) and recorder 
yielding the lowest rates of gestures, which were tiny and strange in shape. So 
while participants produce some gestures even in the absence of a conversational 
partner, they clearly produce more when they know they will be received. 
         In another study, participants were asked to retell a cartoon story in dyads 
either face-to-face or where their partner could not see them, behind a screen 
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(Alibali & Heath, 2001). Participants produced higher rates of fillers (um and uh) 
in face-to-face than when behind a screen. Participants also produced higher rates 
of representational gestures (depicting semantic content) in face-to-face than 
when behind a screen, though beat gestures (rhythmic and non-semantic) were 
produced at about equal rates regardless. The beat gestures could be largely self-
serving, but representational gestures are here shown to be largely produced for 
the benefit of the conversational partner. 
         In a study of filler production, participants spoke to a human voice coming 
from behind an opaque screen, or a computer that had a recording of the same 
human voice playing off of it and asking simple trivia questions (Walker, Risko, 
& Kingstone, 2014). When another human was present in the room, behind the 
screen, the participant produced more fillers. A follow-up experiment tested 
whether the increased use of fillers in the screen condition came from the mere 
presence of the human in the room. The researchers found that just having a 
human experimenter in the room while the recording played off the computer did 
increase the participants' filler production, but not as much as when the participant 
was interacting with the experimenter behind the screen. This finding lends 
further credence to the hypothesis that fillers are produced (at least in part) for the 
benefit of the listener. 
         In a cooking experiment, participants observed a scene where a human or 
robot helper was assisting a novice human baker in baking cupcakes using 
different pragmatic markers (Torrey, Fussell, & Kiesler, 2013). The use of hedges 
and discourse markers were carefully manipulated in order to examine whether 
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their use by an assistant – human or machine – was useful. That is to say, whether 
it made the baking assistant seem more considerate, likable, and less controlling. 
Results indicated that hedges and discourse markers resulted in more positive 
ratings for both humans and robots, most of all when combined. This finding 
further underscores the importance of these speech cues for the listener, and why 
a speaker (even a machine) may benefit from the use of these communicative 
strategies. Interestingly, the use of discourse markers had a larger positive impact 
on ratings of the robot than the human helper. 
         To more closely examine the social impact of discourse markers and 
fillers in a non-task-related narrative setting, as spoken by humans as compared to 
synthesized voices (Larson & Fox Tree, in review), we tested how a speaker was 
rated positively or negatively for a number of traits (trustworthiness, friendliness, 
intelligence and nervousness). Although participants showed a clear preference 
for human over machine speech, we did find that the synthesized voice was rated 
more highly for friendliness while using speech with markers compared to 
without. Synthesized speech was also rated more highly (on combined trait 
ratings) when it was believed to have come from a human with an artificial voice 
box, as opposed to a machine algorithm. Since we found that actual speech 
patterns were less important than this framing, perhaps it is less important for 
machines to work on perfecting speech patterns, and more important to focus on 
making the agents themselves relatable. It may be that the previous findings in the 
cooking experiment differed in that participants were watching videos of humans 
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engaging with these robot agents while performing a complicated task, and this 
contributed to a sense of the robot as being more personable. 
Interpersonal Benefits of Motion Synchrony 
         It is clear that many spoken conversational phenomena are developed for 
the benefit of any listener. Of similar importance is how these behaviors are 
shaped and customized for the benefit of a specific listener. While engaging with 
a communicative partner, people may begin to exhibit signs of behavioral 
mimicry (convergence, synchrony, or alignment) with their partner's linguistic 
behavior (such as speech rate, pauses, accent, utterance length, phonology), as 
well as gaze and facial expressions (Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, & Mclean, 
2010). 
People coordinate behaviors through joint attention, perception, and 
action. For this to be possible, it is helpful to have shared task representations, 
knowing where and what others are doing, and distinguishing cause and effect of 
one's own actions as compared to the actions of others (Sebanz, Bekkering, & 
Knoblich, 2006). Moving in synchrony with another can lead individuals to feel 
that they are contributing to the same enacted effect, which in turn may lead to 
increased feelings of affinity as it becomes difficult to distinguish oneself from an 
other. That said, it is unclear whether this blurring of self-other distinctions relies 
on theory of mind, or that the other be considered a thinking and feeling, even 
living agent. To understand this, it is helpful to conduct synchrony studies with 
machines. 
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Synchrony, or entrainment, involves coordinated and time-locked 
behavioral mimicry (doing what someone else is doing, at the same time as they 
are doing it). Synchrony has proven so effective in helping boost team morale that 
it is often incorporated into games. One such game is Yamove! – a game where 
players wear apple phones on wristbands that measure movement intensity, 
synchrony, and diversity of movement (Isbister, 2012). Pairs of players get 
cooperative scores, and teams face each other and take turns in short rounds, with 
higher scores going to teams who move more in-sync with each other. This set-up 
is designed to feel more interactive than having everyone stare at a screen. This 
style of gaming may become more popular as wearable technology improves, 
turning player attention back towards other players and away from screens or 
tables. While this game is an excellent example of team-based synchrony in 
gaming, the focus is on the other humans in the game, not a virtual machine agent. 
Perhaps if a machine agent were framed as a team member that a human player 
could synchronize and perform with, rather than against, it might be possible to 
observe a blurring of self-other distinctions and a heightened sense of team 
membership with the machine agent. 
In one series of experiments, people engaged in various exercises that 
have been shown to boost synchrony (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). Among these 
are joyful and joyless activities, and muscle-based and rhythm-based activities. In 
one study, participants walked around, either in-step with each other or not, and 
played a trust game. Though walking in sync didn't boost joy ratings, it did 
increase cooperation in the trust game. In another iteration of this study, 
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participants who kept up a rhythm or sang a song (or both) in sync with a group 
showed higher cooperation and had an increased sense of team membership, 
though they did not report more joy. 
         Coordinated attention is very important for synchrony and entrainment. In 
one study, participants were asked to move their hand up and down in time with a 
metronome while an experimenter either moved their hand in the same way at the 
same time (synchrony), in the opposite way at the same time (anti-phase 
synchrony), or not at all. While the performing this task, the researcher would 
read a list of purportedly distracting words that participants were told to ignore. 
Participants in the synchronous condition were the most accurate in identifying a 
photograph of the experimenter’s face (rather than face-morphed versions), and in 
remembering the words they were told to ignore, with the anti-synchrony 
performing second-highest. These results indicate that the act of synchrony with 
another person, in-phase or anti-phase, can improve memory for facial and verbal 
information associated with that person (Macrae, Duffy, Miles, & Lawrence, 
2008). Along with a sense of team membership and increased affinity for another, 
synchrony may result in boosted attention for that agent, perhaps regardless of 
whether the agent is said to be human or machine. 
In another study of behavioral matching and alignment, participants 
displayed synchrony for facial expressions and gestures while performing a route-
communication task (Louwerse, Dale, Bard, & Jeuniaux, 2012). Synchrony was 
shown to increase as the task became more difficult, which could indicate that 
synchrony is an important element of functional communication. There is also 
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some evidence that people may align with computer interlocutors as much as with 
other humans, if not more so, perhaps to make their speech more understandable 
to an agent with a limited vocabulary (Branigan et al., 2010). 
         Certain motion synchrony effects have also been demonstrated in studies 
of human-robot interaction. In one study, a dancing robot named Keepon was put 
on display with a hidden camera and a sign prompting passersby to dance 
(Michalowski, Sabanovic, & Kozima, 2007). There was music playing, but 
Keepon was programmed to respond only to the movement of the dancer in front 
of it. This means that Keepon was not always moving in-time with the music, as a 
result of sometimes having its focus on a participant who had not yet started to 
dance. Participants responded more positively to Keepon when the robot was 
dancing in synchrony with the music, and exhibited a number of corrective 
behaviors when Keepon was out-of-sync (moving in an exaggerated manner, 
touching the robot and forcing it to move in tempo, or standing still and then 
dancing when the robot started to move in tempo). While observational in nature, 
this study offers preliminary evidence indicating that when people are given 
music to move in time with, they desire synchronous interactions with machines. 
 In a follow-up study, researchers tried to make it possible for Keepon to 
lead or follow in a dance-like interaction, using input from a Wii remote and 
balance-board in order to lock onto a child's motion and synchronize with it. 
Keepon was most successful in encouraging dancer retention when synchronizing 
with music rather than with the children themselves (Michalowski, Simmons, & 
Kozima, 2009). That said, when the robot was designated the leader of the dance, 
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children did synchronize with the robot even when it was moving out-of-sync 
with the music (and children spent more time in-sync with music while following 
Keepon’s lead than when leading the dance themselves, which might indicate 
some flaw in Keepon’s ability to detect the motion of participants). Due to the 
nature of the design, this study is hard to generalize outside of contexts involving 
children and dance. Still, there are signs that even lifeless and mindless machines 
may encourage synchrony with their users. 
In one study I collaborated on, we used induced motion synchrony as a 
means of boosting the rate of sarcasm production within a conversational 
exchange (Hammond, D’Arcey, Larson & Fox Tree, in preparation). In this 
study, pairs of participants came in and engaged in 3 different movement 
activities (Simon Says, Ball Passing, and Emotional Mirroring tasks), either while 
facing each other or back-to-back. Next, these dyads engaged in a ten-minute 
conversation about badly dressed celebrities. Finally, the dyads marked instances 
of sarcasm within a video of their conversation as it was produced by themselves 
or by their partner. The collaborative movement condition (facing partner) 
resulted in higher self-report of sarcasm than the non-collaborative movement 
(back-to-back), and participants reported a higher rate of sarcasm use by their 
partner when they reported higher rate of sarcasm in themselves. We conclude 
that collaborative movement can boost self-reported sarcasm, perhaps by 
increasing rapport and prosocial behavior through a synchrony exercise. 
In a series of three experiments, I seek to demonstrate that behavioral 
matching techniques that have been used to produce a sense of social rapport can 
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also be used to similar effect in human-computer and human-robot interactions. If 
machines can be humanized as agents by reframing backstories and through 
collaborative synchronous activities, then it might be possible to rehumanize 
human outgroup members in a similar way.  
Current Studies 
         I speculate that motion synchrony exercises could indeed be used to 
reduce the self-other distinction between people of different groups, perhaps even 
between humans and machines. Having people engage in activities that encourage 
them to converge with another entity could bring them to humanize the 
human/machine agent they are interacting with to a greater extent. If this can be 
demonstrated in human-computer and human-robot interaction, then perhaps it 
could also be used to benefit other ingroup/outgroup relations and reduce social 
stigma. In three experiments, I will investigate how to reshape first-impressions 
by engaging participants in motion synchrony interactions with a non-human 
agent (either human or machine).  
In Experiment 1, participants trained a couple of two-dimensional, 
stationary, cartoon robots to make accurate clinical diagnoses (one robot designed 
to aid therapists and the other to replace therapists, both normed in a Mechanical 
Turk survey study). Next, participants who volunteered for an additional training 
task mimicked the first robot they encountered by repeating the motion they saw 
on the screen. Finally, participants rated the robots along a number of 
humanization traits in a survey following each task.  
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In Experiment 2, participants interacted with a robot, communicating via 
button-press in a choose-your-own-adventure conversation tree design before and 
after a neck-stretching motion synchrony task. After this interactive task, 
participants filled out a survey on humanization as well as memory for the robot. 
The type of responses selected during the interaction with the robot were 
compared between groups. We expected that participants would give more 
positive and warm responses following the synchrony task than participants who 
performed the neck-stretching activity without synchrony. 
In Experiment 3, participants communicated with an addressee who is said 
to be either a machine learning algorithm or another student, who communicated 
with the participant via text on a contentious subject of debate. The addressee was 
set to always disagree with the participant, so as to encourage a sense that the 
addressee belongs to an outgroup. After a short survey, participants interacted in a 
rhythm-based task with the same agent (with an egg shaker) before completing a 
final survey to measure perceived humanization and persuasion of the virtual 
agent. 
Hypotheses tested included: (1) humanization measures – both human 
nature and uniqueness traits – can be applied to the study of human-robot 
interactions; (2) motion synchrony and behavioral matching can lead to more 
positive interactions and higher humanization of a supposedly machine or human 
agent; (3) participants will humanize a supposedly human agent more than a 
machine agent, but collaborative synchrony can increase humanization for 
humans and machine agents alike. 
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Norming RoboShrink and TheraBot – "Robot Design Survey" 
 In order to ascertain whether the visual stimuli used in Study 1 were 
appropriately matched to the name RoboShrink and TheraBot, I conducted a 
Mechanical Turk norming experiment, asking participants to fill out a quick 
survey and rate either the names or the pictures along a number of scales. 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 20 United States Citizens who listed 
English as their native language, collected via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(“Master Turkers” only) who each received fifty cents for participating. 
 Materials. The participants also were asked to complete a Google Forms 
surveys, making use of the shuffle feature within each page to randomly change 
the order the questions were presented in for each participant. They were asked 
questions pertaining to the perceived characteristics of the two robot designs, one 
triangular and one round (Figures 1a and 1b respectively) and whether 
“RoboShrink” and “TheraBot” names were better-suited to one or the other 
design. As the artist, I intended for the triangular robot design to suit the more 
serious therapist replacement role, and the round robot design to suit the cute and 
helpful therapist assistant role. 
Design. This was an exploratory norming study, with all participants in 
one group, answering the same survey questions. 
Procedure. Master Turkers saw this task on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
website and choose to participate or not on a voluntary basis. After completion of 
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the survey, participants received a key code that they returned to Mechanical Turk 
to enter and receive payment. The survey itself took an estimated five minutes to 
complete. 
Figure 1a. Figure 1b. 
  
Figure 1. The two robot stimuli, (a) RoboShrink and (b) TheraBot.  
Results 
Robot names. Of the twenty participants who participated in the survey, 
13 (65%) preferred the name “RoboShrink” for the triangular robot design, while 
11 (55%) of participants preferred the name “TheraBot” for the round robot 
design. 
 Replacement or helper. When asked which robot would better serve as a 
therapist replacement, 10 (50%) selected the image of the triangular robot, 9 
(45%) selected the round robot, and 1 (5%) indicated “possible find another 
design” as a write-in option. When asked which robot would better serve as a 
therapist helper-bot, 16 (80%) selected the image of the round robot, with 4 (20%) 
selecting the triangular robot. 
 Robot qualities. Participants were asked to respond on a Likert scale of 1-
7, with 1 being “Not at all” and 7 being “Definitely,” on whether a given robot 
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name sounded threatening, friendly, trustworthy, and whether they would feel 
comfortable with a therapist of that name. I conducted a series of paired-samples 
t-tests for each quality, and found one significant difference between groups for 
the name sounding threatening. The other differences were not significant, but I 
report them here as well. RoboShrink was rated significantly more threatening (M 
= 3.3, SD = 2.03) than TheraBot (M = 2.1, SD = 1.48), t(19) = 2.77, p = .012. 
RoboShrink was trending less friendly (M = 3.85, SD = 1.6) than TheraBot (M = 
4.8, SD = 1.7), though not quite significant,  t(19) = 1.94, p = .067. RoboShrink 
was trending less trustworthy (M = 4.15, SD = 1.98) than TheraBot (M = 4.3, SD 
= 1.69), though also not significant,  t(19) = 0.29, p = .776. Finally, participants 
tended to rate themselves less comfortable going to RoboShrink (M = 3.45, SD = 
1.64) as compared to TheraBot (M = 4.25, SD = 2.02), though also not significant,  
t(19) = 1.75, p = .096.  
Robot gender. For the triangular robot design, 17 (85%) participants 
described its gender as “male,” as opposed to 2 (10%) saying “female” or 1 (5%) 
saying the triangular robot was not gendered. For the round robot design, only 9 
(45%) participants described the gender as “male,” as opposed to 8 (40%) 
selecting “not gendered,” and 3 (15%) selecting “female.”  
 Overall preference. When asked which design they liked better overall, 
12 (60%) said round robot, 7 (35%) said triangular robot, and 1 (5%) wrote-in 
“dislike both.” 
 Situational preference. Participants responded to a series of forced-
choice questions regarding their preference for the name “RoboShrink” or 
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“TheraBot” for different situations. When asked which robot name appealed to 
them more when paying for chat-bot therapy, 11 participants (55%) selected 
“TheraBot.” When asked which computer tool they would pay for as a therapist to 
help them in making diagnoses, 14 (70%) selected “TheraBot.” When 
recommending a chat-bot service to a friend with depression, 14 (70%) selected 
“TheraBot.” As a programmer, 15 (75%) said they would name their chat-bot 
“TheraBot” if given the choice. 
Discussion 
 I designed the two robot images specifically to encourage participants to 
pay closer attention to the main experimental manipulation (the backstory), with 
one designed as a therapist replacement, and the other designed as a therapist 
helper-bot. Participants expressed a slight preference for the triangular bot as a 
replacement bot (50% as compared to 45%) and a clear preference for the round 
robot design as a helper bot (80%). A majority of participants preferred the name 
“RoboShrink” for the triangular bot design (65%), while a slight majority 
preferred “TheraBot” for the round robot design (55%). 
Unbeknownst to participants, the lead researcher designed the triangular 
robot with the name “RoboShrink” and replacement-bot in mind, and the round 
robot with the name “TheraBot” and the helper-bot in mind. The angular design 
was meant to elicit a sense of seriousness and maturity, while the round design 
was meant to elicit a sense of cuteness and childishness. When asking participants 
their initial impressions of each design, the comments indeed reflect that the 
intended purpose came across. Comparing the triangle and round designs, one 
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participant described them as, “A bureaucrat” and “An entertaining balloon 
animal” respectively. Another said, “It appears a bit sharp and kind of cutting. 
Comes across a bit hard and a little angry” and “It makes me think of a penguin 
and it's kind of cute and cuddly” Another participant wrote, “A professor someone 
that is wise and serious” and “This one seems juvenile like I wouldn't be able to 
take it seriously” Finally, one participant compared them to other animals, saying, 
“A snake. Cold and potentially mean” and “A penguin. Fun and friendly.” 
 Participants in this norming task provide support for the use of a triangular 
RoboShrink as the serious and mature design, and a round TheraBot as the cute 
and childlike design. Only a slight majority expressed an overall preference for 
TheraBot over RoboShrink, however (60%). It is also interesting to note that 
RoboShrink was viewed as having a gender (with most participants, 85%, 
describing it as male) more so than TheraBot (with only slightly more describing 
the robot as male, 45%, as compared to not-gendered, 40%). It is unclear whether 
these gender perceptions were driven by the perception of other characteristics the 
robots seemed to exhibit, which fell into categorical stereotypes of gender, or 
whether it was from something more integral to the design. 
Experiment 1 – "Getting The Help They Need":  
Preferences for a Helper or Replacement Robot Therapist 
 With the robot designs tested and confirmed for their roles as helper or 
replacement robot therapists, I designed Experiment 1 as the first in a series of 
experiments to demonstrate that humanization scales (previously used only in 
studies of humans) and behavioral matching tasks (mimicry) can both be used in 
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the study of human-robot interactions. I predicted that participants would prefer to 
interact with and train the helper bot, TheraBot, over the replacement bot, 
RoboShrink, in line with research I had formerly collected from the same 
participant pool that indicated a strong preference for human over chat-bot 
therapists (Larson & Fox Tree, in review). I also predicted that the voluntary 
mimicry task would result in a boost for the humanization scores of both 
RoboShrink and TheraBot, as it would increase a sense of team-membership with 
the machine (although perhaps not as effectively as a motion synchrony task). 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 64 undergraduate students at the 
University of California, Santa Cruz, who each received course credit for 
participating. Of these, 20 participants volunteered and participated in an 
additional mimicry task. A total of 24 participants answered questions on the 
post-study survey that indicated the participant had not read and fully understood 
the stimuli (of these, 9 were volunteers for the additional mimicry task), and were 
consequently excluded from all but the impression change after mimicry analysis. 
For that set of comparison, participants who did not complete the additional 
training task were excluded, but participants who failed one or more of the 
manipulation checks were re-included, as we were interested in changes in 
impressions before and after the mimicry task. 
 Materials. The first experimental task was coded in Python 3.0, using the 
AppJar GUI Library for an interactive presentation of stimuli, as well as Pandas 
for saving output to a CSV file for each participant's in-task reaction time and 
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accuracy data. The task itself was run on Mac OS X (version 10.6.8). This task 
also included two versions of two robot design images for "RoboShrink" and 
"TheraBot" (triangular design and round design, respectively) either as a floating 
image, or as an image within a therapist office scene, either sitting on the therapist 
chair (Figure 2a), or beside it (Figure 2b), respectively.  
The text-based experimental stimuli took the form of two separate 
backstories for the robots (Table 1), as well as case stories that participants used 
to select a diagnosis from three multiple choice options. These case studies were 
collected and adapted by research assistants in the lab from a variety of sources 
(Cooper, 2011; Gillig, 2009; Lane, 2017; Manning, 1999; Rolls, 2015; Shah & 
Nakamura, 2010; Spitzer, Skodol, & Gibbon, 2002; Trull & Prinstein, 2013). The 
additional mimicry task included face-masked stimuli from a library of GIFs on 
American Sign Language found online at http://www.lifeprint.com/asl101/gifs-
animated/. Participants of the optional task were recorded using QuickTime 
Player (version 10.4) and Logitech HD Pro Webcam C920. The participants also 
were asked to complete either 1 or 2 Google Forms surveys, making use of the 
shuffle feature within each page to randomly change the order the questions were 
presented in for each participant. 
Figure 2a. Figure 2b. 
  
Figure 2. The two robot stimuli in full scene, (a) RoboShrink and (b) TheraBot.  
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Table 1.  
RoboShrink “We are testing another computer algorithm 
called RoboShrink. It is designed to REPLACE 
human therapists with a cheaper and more 
convenient option for treatment.” 
TheraBot “We are testing a computer algorithm called 
TheraBot. It is designed to HELP therapists in 
treating their patients, not to replace human 
therapists altogether.” 
Table 1. The two sets of instructions, for RoboShrink and TheraBot.  
 Design. I used a 2 (“RoboShrink” Replacement or “TheraBot” Helper 
Backstory) x 2 (Motion Synchrony or Non-Motion Task) within-subjects design. 
Each participant saw the same robot designs, but half of participants saw 
RoboShrink first, and half saw TheraBot first (to control for possible order or 
practice effects). Participants all saw case studies 1-10 for the first robot in 
shuffled order, followed by case studies 11-20 for the second robot in shuffled 
order. Each case study was assigned a specific set of multiple choice options 
(designed to be correct, almost-correct, and incorrect) organized in such a way 
that both robots would answer the same number of times correctly (3), almost-
correctly (4), and incorrectly (3), while selecting each option (1, 2, or 3) the same 
number of times, (3, 4, and 3 respectively).  
After finishing the first task, participants were asked to participate in an 
optional video-recorded motion task to help train the first robot they read about. 
The accuracy and reaction time within the first task, the ratings of the two robots 
along a humanization scale, as well as a direct comparison of the robots and a 
rating for preference of one over the other will all act as dependent variables of 
interest. Additionally, I will look to see if the humanization rating of the first 
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robot changes from the first survey to the second (for those who choose to 
participate in an optional sign language behavior-matching mimicry task). I also 
asked the participant to rate their interest in clinical psychology, as well as 
experience with computers. 
 Procedure. Participants first completed a clinical case study diagnosis 
task. This task was composed of the following: Introduction to first robot, 10 case 
study multiple choice trials, introduction to second robot, 10 more case studies, 
and a final thank-you. The introduction screens described either RoboShrink or 
TheraBot, as well as the picture of the robot in a therapist's office (Figure 2). 
These two introductory instruction slides appeared for 20 seconds before the 
participant was allowed to press space to continue. After viewing the first 
instruction slide where they were introduced to the first robot, participants saw the 
first case study slide, with a description of a fictional character to diagnose and 3 
multiple choice options they could select between for diagnosis.  
First the robot made a selection out of the 3 options by underlining the 
text, with the picture of the robot alongside the options. The participant could then 
confirm the robot's choice or make a different one by pressing 1, 2, or 3, and their 
response was bolded. They could change their response an unlimited number of 
times before pressing space to continue to the next case story. Participants were 
not told that they would be seeing more than one robot, but they would be 
introduced to the second robot after they completed the 10th case study multiple 
choice question. Trials 11-20 proceeded in the same way as 1-10, but with 
different case studies (the stories were shuffled within these two blocks). The 
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final screen participants saw thanked them and asked for their feedback in an 
upcoming survey.  
After they completed this survey, the research assistant said, "You're all 
done with the experiment, but would you like to stay and help us improve <first-
robot-name> in a short video-recorded task?" If they decided to volunteer for the 
optional task, they signed a second consent form specifically for the video release, 
and were escorted to a different computer room that was set up with the video-
recording equipment and a Google Slide presentation including American Sign 
Language movements that they were asked to imitate, in order to help the robot 
learn to “interact with people in real-time and understand body language,” 
according to their instructions. They were reminded that they could leave at any 
time. The research assistant maked a note of their start and end times, as well as 
which slide they stopped on. The participants filled out a short final exit survey 
with questions similar to those on the previous survey, but this time only for the 
robot they has just helped train, and were thanked for their time. All participants 
received course credit for participation. 
Results  
Subjective measures. Of primary interest in the design of this experiment 
were the subjective ratings of humanization, and subscales (Human Nature and 
Human Uniqueness), for both robot designs, as well as before and after the 
optional mimicry task. 
 Initial robot preferences. I conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA (to 
control for possible order effects of robot presentation) and found that there were 
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no significant differences in the humanization of RoboShrink as compared to 
TheraBot on Survey 1, F(1,38) = 1.23, p = .274.  
Excluding participants who did not identify their preferred robot, I 
conducted a one-way ANOVA to look at the combined Human Nature and 
Human Uniqueness scores (grouped by positive and negative) for RoboShrink and 
TheraBot to see if higher preference was related to more humanization of a given 
robot. Participants who expressed an initial preference for Roboshrink rated it 
more highly for Human Nature traits (M = 3.9, SD = 1.76) compared to those who 
preferred TheraBot (M = 2.56, SD = 0.96), F(1,32) = 8.02, p = .008. Those who 
preferred RoboShrink also rated it more highly for Human Uniqueness traits (M = 
4.63, SD = 1.48) than those who preferred TheraBot (M =3.5, SD = 1.17), F(1,32) 
= 5, p = .032. Although there were no statistically significant differences between 
groups on ratings of negative qualities for RoboShrink, the combined Human 
Nature and Human Uniqueness scores followed the same pattern as the 
aforementioned results. For Human Nature traits, RoboShrink was rated more 
highly overall by RoboShrink than TheraBot fans (M = 4.91, SD = 0.89 & M = 
4.15, SD = 0.54, respectively), F(1,32) = 8.81, p = .006. For Human Uniqueness 
traits, RoboShrink was rated more highly overall by RoboShrink than TheraBot 
fans (M = 4.96, SD = 0.86 & M = 3.9, SD = 0.74, respectively), F(1,32) = 11.66, p 
= .002. This means that overall, the combined Humanization score for 
RoboShrink was higher among those who preferred RoboShrink (M = 4.94, SD = 
0.8) than those who preferred TheraBot (M = 4.03, SD = 0.57), F(1,32) = 13.01, p 
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= .001. There were no such group differences for humanization ratings of 
TheraBot. 
For RoboShrink, within-subjects positive scores for Human Nature and 
Human Uniqueness items were highly correlated, for both positive items (r = 
.755, p < .001), negative items (r = .53, p < .001), and overall combined 
humanization scores (r = .69, p < .001), while Human Nature and Human 
Uniqueness scores differed significantly for all but the combined score metric. A 
paired-samples t-test revealed that for positively-valenced items, participants 
rated RoboShrink more highly for positive Human Uniqueness traits (M = 3.85, 
SD = 1.26) than Human Nature traits (M = 2.92, SD = 1.35), t(39) = 6.32, p < 
.001. For negatively-valenced items, participants still rated RoboShrink more 
highly for negative Human Uniqueness traits (M = 3.5, SD = 1.33) than Human 
Nature traits (M = 2.19, SD = 1.18), t(39) = 6.70, p < .001. Overall, participants 
gave RoboShrink a positively-valenced average score that trended higher for 
Human Nature (M = 4.37, SD = 0.69) than Human Uniqueness (M = 4.17, SD = 
0.88) combined scores, though not significantly, t(39) = 1.92, p = .062. 
For TheraBot, within-subjects positive scores for Human Nature and 
Human Uniqueness items were highly correlated, for positive items (r = .61, p < 
.001), and overall combined scores (r = .422, p = .007), though not for negative 
items, while Human Nature and Human Uniqueness scores differed significantly 
for all but the combined score metric. A paired-samples t-test revealed that for 
positively-valenced items, participants rated TheraBot more highly for positive 
Human Uniqueness traits (M = 4, SD = 0.99) than Human Nature traits (M = 3.06, 
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SD = 1.14), t(39) = 6.24, p < .001. For negatively-valenced items, participants still 
rated TheraBot more highly for negative Human Uniqueness traits (M = 3.16, SD 
= 1.2) than Human Nature traits (M = 2.28, SD = 1.08), t(39) = 4.01, p < .001. 
There were no significant differences for TheraBot's combined scores on Human 
Nature versus Human Uniqueness. 
The combined humanization score for RoboShrink was inversely 
correlated with the preference score for TheraBot (from a combination of 
responses to scenarios where one robot would be better than the other), r = -.35, p 
= .027. However, while humanization of TheraBot was positively trending with 
the combined preference score for TheraBot, it was not significantly correlated, r 
= .29, p = .071. A one-way ANOVA analyses did not indicate that there were 
significant differences in the humanization of a robot based on perceived gender-
similarity between participant and robot.   
 Impression change after mimicry. I examined whether humanization 
impressions on the robot that participants were asked to train improved following 
the optional mimicry task. These tests revealed that for participants who trained 
RoboShrink, there was a trending correlation between the first time they rated 
RoboShrink on positive (r = .55, p = .067), and high correlation on negative (r = 
.62, p = .031) Human Nature items. These participants who trained RoboShrink 
also had a high correlation between the first and second time they rated 
RoboShrink on positive (r = .69, p = .012) and negative (r = .69, p = .013) Human 
Uniqueness items. There were no high correlations within-subjects for TheraBot 
training and humanization, however. 
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 That said, there were significant differences in overall humanization 
scores of the robot that participants opted to train in the additional mimicry task. 
A one-way ANOVA reveals that participants who trained TheraBot in the post-
experimental mimicry task also gave the bot they trained higher overall scores for 
Human Nature (M = 5.2, SD = 0.66) than did participants who trained 
RoboShrink (M = 4.28, SD = 0.42), F(1,18) = 14.9, p = .001. Participants who 
trained TheraBot in the post-experimental mimicry task also gave the bot they 
trained higher overall scores for Human Uniqueness (M = 4.96, SD = 0.5) than did 
participants who trained RoboShrink (M = 4.23, SD = 0.88), F(1,18) = 4.5, p = 
.048. Moreover, participants who trained TheraBot in the post-experimental 
mimicry task also gave the bot they trained higher overall scores for combined 
Humanization scales (M = 5.08, SD = 0.52) than did participants who trained 
RoboShrink (M = 4.25, SD = 0.62), F(1,18) = 9.71, p = .006. 
Behavioral measures. Aside from subjective responses in the post-
experimental survey, other more behavioral measures were compared. These 
included oder effects, reaction time, accuracy in the case diagnosis task, and 
participation in the mimicry task.  
Order effects. Participants took more time (in milliseconds) to complete 
the first ten case studies (M = 353.61, SD = 89.94) than the second set of ten case 
studies (M = 314.24, SD = 118.21), t(39) = 3.51, p = .001. This demonstrates a 
learning and possibly practice effect. In addition, Participants tended to be less 
accurate on the first ten case studies (M = 17.23, SD = 2.28) than on the second 
ten case studies (M = 18.38, SD = 2.28), t(39) = 2,7, p = .01. The time a 
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participant took to complete Block 1 and Block 2 was highly correlated (r = .801, 
p < .001), but a participant's accuracy on Block 1 and Block 2 only tended to be 
correlated (r = .303, p = .057). 
People had a strong preference for the first robot they encountered. Those 
who saw TheraBot first were more likely to give RoboShrink higher ratings for 
negative Human Nature traits (M = 2.61, SD = 1.26) compared to those who saw 
RoboShrink first (M = 1.77, SD = 0.96), t(38) = 2.37, p = .023. Those who saw 
TheraBot first tended to give TheraBot, by contrast, higher ratings for positive 
Human Nature traits (M = 3.37, SD = 1.03) than those who saw RoboShrink first 
(M = 2.74, SD = 1.19), t(38) = 1.79, p = .082. Those who saw TheraBot first also 
tended to give TheraBot higher ratings for positive Human Uniqueness traits (M = 
4.28, SD = 0.74) than those who saw RoboShrink first (M = 3.71, SD = 1.13), 
t(38) = 1.89, p = .067. There was also a tendency for those who saw TheraBot 
first to give RoboShrink higher ratings for negative Human Uniqueness traits (M 
= 3.88, SD = 1.14) than those who saw RoboShrink first (M = 3.11, SD = 1.42), 
t(38) = 1.89, p = .066. 
Reaction time. A paired-samples t-test revealed that participants 
responded similarly on the case study task regardless of which robot they were 
interacting with, t(39) = 0.9, p = .377, with high correlation of total reaction time 
(r = .67, p < .001) for RoboShrink and TheraBot trials. No significant differences 
between robot trials were found for reaction time or accuracy. 
Accuracy in task. I conducted a one-way ANOVA to see if response 
accuracy in the clinical trial task for case identification differed between the 
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participant’s preferred bot (if participants were more likely to choose the 
distractor answers that one robot selected over the other), but found no significant 
differences after removing participants who selected something other than 
RoboShrink or TheraBot as their preferred bot. 
 Participation in optional task. An independent samples t-test revealed that 
participants who preferred RoboShrink and passed the manipulation checks spent 
significantly more time gesturing in the optional training task (M = 20.83, SD = 
4.12) than participants who preferred TheraBot (M = 12.6, SD = 6.91), t(9) = 2.46, 
p = .036. When looking for possible demographic differences between the 
participants who opted to participate in the additional mimicry task or not, an 
independent samples t-test indicated a pattern that went against what I had 
previously predicted. Participants who opted to train RoboShrink in the post-
experimental mimicry task were more likely to have rated themselves as 
interested in pursuing a career in therapy (M = 6.25, SD = 0.87) than those who 
opted to train TheraBot (M = 5, SD = 1.2), t(18) = 2.72, p = .014. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 included not only humanization measures, but also several 
behavioral measures, designed to assess the importance of visual and backstory 
cues on reactions to the two robot designs. 
 Humanization measures. The humanization measures used here are 
typically reserved for describing the perceived characteristics of humans 
(Crawford, Modri, & Motyl, 2013; Haslam, 2006) but, as demonstrated here, can 
also be applied to robots. A priori, it seemed reasonable to expect that the 
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humanization scale may not work the same way for humans as machines, so it 
was important to conduct this first experiment and see what kinds of ratings the 
robots tend to get.  
In fact, people were happy to apply humanization judgements to robots. A 
couple participants picked the middle number in the scale, “4,” for every item in 
the humanization scale (n = 2), but this was uncommon (3.13% of the sample). In 
addition, judgements of one robot influenced judgements of another robot. People 
who saw TheraBot first gave RoboShrink a higher score for both negative and 
positive Human Nature and Human Uniqueness traits, compared to those who saw 
RoboShrink first.  
Nonetheless, the humanization scale may function differently for humans 
than for machines – even negative human nature and uniqueness traits are still 
humanization traits. This means that instead of looking at the scale as being a 
human–nonhuman rating system, it is more informative to look at it as a way of 
measuring whether the robot is (1) exhibiting more features of a living, conscious 
being and (2) whether those features are seen as prosocial or antisocial.  
Mimicry with machines. In addition, behavioral matching tasks (here, 
mimicry) typically used in human-human contexts can be used in human-
computer or human-robot contexts in order to improve relations between a human 
and machine. The humanization ratings for RoboShrink were highly correlated 
between the first rating, and the post-mimicry rating, but this wasn’t the case for 
TheraBot humanization ratings. While there were no clear differences in 
humanization ratings for RoboShrink and TheraBot in the first survey, 
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humanization ratings for TheraBot were higher than those of RoboShrink 
following the optional mimicry task.  
After participating in the optional training task, and looking at between-
subjects differences in ratings for the bot they helped train, we found that 
participants who trained TheraBot did rate it higher on the humanization scales 
than those who trained and rated RoboShrink after the mimicry task. This result 
indicates that differences in backstories and appearances can lead to some 
differences in the way people rate the machines on these scales if they are asked 
to perform a behavioral matching task with the robot. It is possible that mimicry 
can improve humanization ratings for cute robots, but not for serious or 
emotionally distant robots. 
 Participant accuracy. Of course, this experiment was not without its 
challenges. A pilot version of this experiment indicated that participants had 
difficulty accurately remembering the backstories for robots (this experiment 
originally had a between-subjects design where half of participants read the 
“replace” and the other half read the “help” backstories for RoboShink). I opted 
for a within-subjects design in hopes that participants would be able to directly 
compare the backstory of one robot to another, and yet 24 of the 64 participants 
failed at least one of the manipulation check questions (two open-ended questions 
first, followed by two multiple-choice questions in the post-experimental survey). 
While I had expected that the participants who chose to volunteer would be the 
more attentive and diligent participants (to put in extra time that was not required 
of them), I in fact found the opposite to be the case. The fail rate for the 
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participants who didn’t volunteer was about 34%, while it was 45% for those who 
did choose to volunteer for the additional video-recorded mimicry task. So even 
though the participants all saw the word “REPLACE” or “HELP” in all-caps 
letters on the instruction screens, and saw both robots (who had been normed for 
the best fit of design to function), over a third of participants had difficulty 
remembering which was which.  
Looking more closely, the participants who failed on one test question 
often failed on multiple questions, with a total of 29 (45.3%) participants failing 
at least one manipulation check question on the purpose of RoboShrink, and 15 
(23.4%) failing at least one question on the purpose of Therabot. As this is the 
same pattern observed in the pilot version of this task, it is possible that the huge 
fail rate is possibly resulting from a bias to think of robots as assistants rather than 
replacements for humans performing emotional work, despite the fact that such 
robots are out there and becoming more popular all the time (Fitzpatrick et al., 
2017). 
 As a potential counter-argument to the notion that computers are making 
us stupid, we found that participants were more likely to be influenced by the bad 
choices of a robot that they trained in Block 1 of the clinical diagnosis task as 
compared to Block 2. Perhaps this is an encouraging finding, that people may be 
influenced by a machine, but with increased exposure to a task and to the robots, 
will begin to trust their own instincts more. In any case, the robot’s incorrect 
choices certainly don’t seem to impede rational decision-making abilities within 
the scope of this clinical diagnosis task, once a participant became acclimated to 
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it. While there may be some fears that people put too much trust in machines in a 
bad way, this can potentially be remedied through increased exposure to different 
robots.  
Individual differences. There seems to be something special about 
participants who selected RoboShrink as their preferred robot. They were more 
easily guided to make bad choices by their preferred robot, and humanize their 
preferred bot more than those who preferred TheraBot, and also spending more 
time on the optional mimicry task when they chose to volunteer. Completely 
counter to my prediction, those who opted into training RoboShrink also reported 
an interest in pursuing a career in therapy more so than those who opted to train 
TheraBot. From my previous research on human-robot interaction opinions, 
participants had indicated a strong dislike for the idea of consulting with a chatbot 
therapist as compared to a human therapist over chat (Larson & Fox Tree, in 
review). If participants who report an interest in therapy as a career opt to train 
RoboShrink in greater numbers than TheraBot, it seems like they are working to 
put themselves out of a job (since RoboShrink was designed to replace therapists, 
while TheraBot was designed to be a therapist’s assistant. Or perhaps they are 
motivated by something truly altruistic: they may be more interested in working 
to make automation of the workforce possible, in order to benefit those who do 
not otherwise have access to affordable therapy (since TheraBot would 
supposedly be used in conjunction with existing therapeutic methods). 
Need for physical robots. Experiment 1 provided some useful insights 
into how people develop and adapt impressions of non-living machine agents, but 
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wasn’t without limitations. Firstly, participants had some difficulty remembering 
the backstories of the agents, perhaps due to the within-subjects design. It’s 
possible that a between-subjects design could result in less confusion over the 
framing of a machine agent, although previous research in the lab suggests that 
perhaps participants have a hard time grasping the idea that machine agents can 
be capable of replacing humans in general (Larson & Fox Tree, in review). 
Secondly, I was unable to employ real, physical agents in this task. This means 
that I was unable to create a true synchrony motion-based task for participants to 
perform, and needed to instead rely on the use of GIFs for the robot’s purported 
sign language gestures. There is also reason to believe that the presence of a 
physical robot in itself can result in a greater degree of situational empathy for the 
machine (Seo, Geiskkovitch, Nakane, King, & Young, 2015). The upcoming 
studies will provide useful information regarding the importance of a robot or 
computer agent’s behavior or human-status, and whether these features will lead 
to differing benefits from motion synchrony and collaborative interventions. The 
next experiment makes use of physical robots instead of simple drawings. 
Experiment 2 – "Engaging with a Robot":  
Interactions with a Robot Before and After a Motion Task 
In Experiment 2, people interacted with a machine that bore the likeness 
of a prototypical robot while performing a motion synchrony task, which is more 
involved than the simple non-synchronous motion dictation task in the first 
experiment. As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to assess humanization 
and other characteristics, and I predicted that the motion synchrony task would 
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lead to more positive ratings along these scales as compared to a non-synchrony 
task. This second experiment also involved a new set of measures for participants’ 
recollection of the robot’s visual and verbal features, with the prediction that 
synchrony would boost attention on the agent, and therefore memory of the robot 
agent (Macrae et al., 2008).  
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 161 undergraduate students at the 
University of California, Santa Cruz, who each received course credit for 
participating. Of the original 212 participants, 51 were excluded from the 
analysis, due to equipment malfunction (n = 47), power outage (n = 1), or because 
they said they were not fluent in English (n = 3).  
Figure 3a. Figure 3b. 
  
Figure 3. Mabu, (a) all three available robots and (b) the participant set-up.  
 Materials. The robotic agent was one of three Mabu robots from Catalia 
Health (Figure 3a) that were each programmed using Twine and Lua to perform a 
series of conversational turns and gestures, as well as stretching motions for the 
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participant to imitate. While the participant interacted with just one of the three 
robots (Figure 3b), there were two back-up robots in case of malfunction. Each 
participant communicated with the robot in a series of semi-scripted 
conversational turns, where they could select one of a number of responses to 
each of the robot’s conversational turns. Survey measures were administered via 
Google Forms. The robot was positioned at the end of the table in a well-lit room, 
approximately 8 inches from the participant, to allow for the best view of the 
participant’s face from the perspective of the robot’s camera (not used to make 
recordings, only for face-tracking purposes).  
 Design. There were two between-subject levels: motion synchrony and 
non-synchrony. Unlike the previous experiment, this time the embodied agent 
always had the same story and appearance, and the only noticeable difference was 
whether it performed the rhythm-based task in synchrony while directing the 
participant through a series of neck stretches or merely directed the stretches 
without moving. I compared humanization ratings and memory for the robot 
between the two groups, but also performed exploratory analyses to see which 
options the participants selected as they worked through a conversation with the 
machine, and compared the types of responses they select before and after 
participating in either a synchronous or non-synchronous motion-based task with 
the robot. Participants also filled out a brief survey after the task about their 
memory for what the robot said and looked like, humanization measures, as well 
as their general opinions about the usefulness of robots as well as their 
capabilities and whether they would consider buying one sometime in the future. 
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 Procedure. Participants came into the lab, and were then introduced to 
one of the three effectively identical robots (Figure 3a). They responded to a 
series of conversational prompts, with the robot always initiating the 
conversational topic and providing a number of possible responses for the user to 
select via touch-screen press, where certain responses could indicate a lack of 
eagerness on the part of the participant and initiate a quitting block. If a 
participant did not decide to quit during this initial greeting block, they continued 
on to the motion activity block, where the robot (introduced as Mabu) would 
either ask them to watch and repeat a set of stretching motions (non-synchrony), 
or watch and mimic the same stretching motions (synchrony). 
Periodically throughout the conversation, participants were prompted by 
the machine with four possible response options. These were designed to allow 
for a spectrum of responses, being either essentially positive (agreeable, upbeat, 
compliant) or negative (disagreeable, a downer, noncompliant) in meaning and 
warm (empathizing, kind, polite) or cold (un-empathizing, gruff, impolite) in 
tone. This meant that there were 4 options for the participant on each screen: 
Positive–Warm, Positive–Cold, Negative–Warm, and Negative–Cold (in that 
order from top to bottom).  
Following the motion activity were two short closing blocks, giving the 
participant an opportunity to provide some feedback to Mabu’s face. Finally, the 
participant was escorted to a separate room to fill out another short survey, 
including a long-answer section on possible improvements for better interactions 
with machines in future iterations of the design, as well as memory for the robot. 
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Results 
 Participants in the two groups were compared on overall humanization, 
memory for the robot, and in-task response valence.  
 Humanization of the robot. While I expected to find more positive 
humanization of the agent by participants who participated in the motion 
synchrony task than those in the non-synchrony task (due to a sense of increased 
in-group membership), no significant group differences were observed. Still, 
while the groups did not significantly differ in overall humanization (positive 
minus negative scores) or any other humanization subscale, the minor differences 
between synchrony and non-synchrony groups did trend in the predicted 
direction. The synchrony group rated the robot slightly higher on total average 
humanization, positive and negative traits combined (M = 3.48, SD = 0.59) than 
the non-synchrony group (M = 3.38, SD = 0.51), t(159) = 1.13, p = .26, 95%CI = 
[-0.07, 0.27]. The synchrony group also rated the robot slightly higher on the 
positively valenced humanization traits (M = 2.84, SD = 1.28) than the non-
synchrony group (M = 2.63, SD = 1.44), t(159) = 0.99, p = .33, 95%CI = [-0.21, 
0.64].  
Memory for the robot. While I predicted that memory for the robot’s 
features would be better following the synchrony task as compared to the non-
synchrony task, I did not observe any significant difference in memory between 
the groups. Out of all participants, 59.6% correctly wrote-in the robot’s name in 
the post-experimental survey (only correct spelling of “Mabu” was accepted), and 
27.3% of participants correctly identified the robot’s stated occupation (“Wellness 
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Coach”). For the question regarding whether the robot had hands, 47.8% said 
“yes,” 43.5% said “no,” and 8.7% wrote in some other response. Opinions were 
less divided on whether the robot had feet, with 18% saying “yes,” 67.1% saying 
“no,” and 14.9% writing in another response. The write-in responses made it clear 
that many participants were unsure of what would qualify as “hands” and “feet” 
and were forced to come up with their own definition.  
Response valence. I conducted a series of independent samples t-tests, 
looking at participant response data within the Human–Robot conversation that 
followed the initial greeting block (before the experimental manipulation). As 
predicted, participants in the synchronous condition were more likely to select 
Positive–Warm responses (M = 80.03% of a participant's responses, SD = 18%) 
than those in the non-synchronous condition following the stretching activity (M 
= 71.07% of a participant's responses, SD = 24.58%), t(148.51) = 2.65, p = .009, 
95%CI = [0.02, 0.16]. Conversely, participants in the synchronous condition were 
less likely to select Positive–Cold responses (M = 16.6% of a participant's 
responses, SD = 15.6%) than those in the non-synchronous condition following 
the stretching activity (M = 25.17% of a participant's responses, SD = 21.55%), 
t(147.69) = 2.9, p = .004, 95%CI = [0.03, 0.14]. 
Overall, Positive responses were more popular than Negative responses 
(97.15% as compared to 2.85% of all valenced responses). In fact, a majority 
75.78% of participants only selected Positive responses, with only 24.22% of 
participants opting for at least one Negative response. Positive–Warm responses 
were the most popular response option from conversation start to finish (74.43% 
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of responses), with Positive–Cold as the second-most frequent selection (22.73% 
of responses). Negative–Warm responses were selected a mere 2.43% of the time, 
and Negative–Cold responses were only selected 0.41% of the time. Considering 
the low frequency of Negative responses, there were too few responses to make 
an assessment. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 included the same humanization scale used in the first 
experiment, but also some more exploratory measures, including memory for the 
robot agent, and response valence in the task. The robots presented some unique 
challenges, also discussed in the following section. 
 Humanization of the robot. There were no significant group differences 
on total humanization scores (positive minus negative traits) or on Human 
Uniqueness and Human Nature subtotal scores. Previously, in Experiment 1, 
participants were introduced to a friendly robot assistant for a therapist 
(TheraBot) and a potentially threatening robot replacement for a therapist 
(RoboShrink). Participants could then either volunteer to mimic TheraBot or 
RoboShrink, and humanization scores were measured before and after this 
mimicry task. 
 In Experiment 2, the robot was never intentionally designed to pose a 
threat to the Psychology undergraduate population of study, and I only included a 
measure of humanization following the rhythm task, so I couldn’t compare within 
the participants to see if synchrony resulted in a positive change in the score. The 
humanization scale was included mostly for consistency across experimental 
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measures for eventual comparison between Experiments 1, 2, and 3 (to compare 
humanization of robot drawings, physical robots, and supposed machine agents 
versus human agents, respectively). It makes a certain amount of sense that 
participants would not have cause to dehumanize the robot more in one group 
than the other in this experiment. That said, I was hopeful that the synchrony task 
would lead participants to identify the robot more as an in-group member and 
therefore give the robot a more positive humanization score overall. 
 In Experiment 3, participants were introduced to a human or algorithm 
addressee that disagreed with them on a political topic. I expected this to prompt 
participants to consider their addressee as an out-group member, who might 
potentially be re-humanized following a synchrony task.  
 Memory for the agent. In Experiment 2, I hoped to find differences 
between groups on memory for the robot's features and character details, given 
prior literature in human–human interaction (Macrae, Duffy, Miles, & Lawrence, 
2008). However, the relatively simplistic design of the robot (as compared to a 
human face) made this difficult. Most participants could accurately recall the 
robot's color (yellow) and eye color (blue with black pupils), with few guessing 
other colors. What’s more, the questions about whether the robot had hands and 
feet became a rather more philosophical question than I had anticipated. For 
example, when asked whether the robot had hands, many participants wrote in a 
response like: “Not definitive hands I could see, but it was holding the Ipad [sic] 
with arms--not sure if there were ‘hands’.” and “Yes (sort of) it was able to hold 
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the tablet but I did not necessarily see appendages that resembled hands.” and “I'd 
day [sic] they were more like nubs.” 
 Because of this, the only two useful measures of memory turned out to be 
questions on details from the initial greeting block of the conversation, where they 
learned the robot's name and occupation. But because these details preceded the 
stretching activity and were written and spoken rather than purely visual in nature, 
the ability of the participant to remember these details is of limited value, and I 
did not find that groups differed in how well they could recall these details. 
Response valence. The overwhelmingly Positive responses to the robots 
could potentially result from a desire to be agreeable and polite when interacting 
with machines, as demonstrated in much of the literature on machines as social 
agents (Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999). Regardless of whether they interacted with 
the robot in synchrony or not, participants didn’t want to be rude to a robot by 
responding with “I'm not sure I got it right” (Negative–Warm) or “Eh, I didn't 
really try” (Negative–Cold), and preferred to select responses like “I think I did it 
correctly” (Positive–Warm) and “I guess I did alright” (Positive–Cold) instead. 
While Negative responses were designed to be disagreeable, dissenting, 
and non-compliant, Positive responses were designed to be agreeable, upbeat, and 
compliant. Because students who choose to participate were doing so on a 
voluntary basis, it is likely that they felt little cause to be non-compliant or 
disagreeable. Similarly, Cold responses were designed to be non-empathetic, 
gruff, and impolite, while Warm responses were designed to be empathetic, kind, 
and polite. Due to the endearing qualities of the robot agent, participants may 
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have generally felt a inclination to respond warmly to the machine agent. Whether 
participants chose to respond warmly or coldly to the robot likely said more about 
their actual feelings about the robot than the positivity or negativity of the 
response, which was a better indicator of how they were feeling about the 
experiment as a whole. 
 The ordering of valenced responses (always Positive–Warm, Positive–
Cold, Negative–Warm, Negative–Cold) might have been part of the reason why 
participants mostly selected Positive over Negative responses. However, the fact 
that there were group differences in selection of Positive–Warm vs. Positive–Cold 
indicates that response selection could be influenced by synchronous interaction 
with the robot. Order of response options alone could not be the driving force in 
response selection. 
Robot caveats. In Experiment 2, physical robots were used in place of 
two-dimensional pictures, but this resulted in certain limitations. The robots 
themselves would occasionally act up and need to be temporarily put out of 
service. Thankfully, with three robots available, we were able to do a quick switch 
in most cases. The exception to this is when the mechanical problem occurred 
after the very start of the experiment, after the participant had already been 
introduced to the robot by name, we were unable to restart the experiment. The 
robots were capable of eye-tracking, but only at very close proximity.  
Additionally, the participant was instructed to sit close to the robot, but 
this in itself could lead to a certain degree of discomfort (See Walters, Syrdal, 
Koay, Dautenhahn, & te Boekhorst, 2008). One participant wrote, “at first i 
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thought it was strange why we have to sit so close to the robots but i figured it 
was for the robot.” If the participant moved too far away for a more comfortable 
position, eye tracking would not work as well. It is perhaps because of this that 
some participants wrote things like “i never knew if it was actually looking at me 
or not” in the post-experimental questionnaire. In addition to this problem, some 
researchers suggest that when robots are perceived as having emotional 
experiences (moving or looking like a human), this can induce an uncanny valley 
effect (Gray & Wegner, 2012).  
In the next experiment, we will not be using pictures or physical robots, 
but instead will go back to a study of framing (telling participants they are 
interacting with a human or machine) and will employ a between-subjects design 
to reduce possible confusion that might arise from hearing multiple backstories. 
This final experiment will provide useful insight into how rhythm-based motion 
activities might improve interpersonal relations between humans or with machine 
agents who are introduced as members of an outgroup (who disagree with the 
participant on a political topic). 
Experiment 3 – "Rhythm & News":  
Bridging Political Differences via Rhythmic Synchrony 
In Experiment 3 I worked to extend findings from Experiments 1 and 2 
into human-human interaction. In this design, I tested whether presenting an 
anonymous virtual agent as a human participant or machine-learning algorithm 
would shape initially-held beliefs about that agent, and whether those initial 
impressions could be altered with a rhythm-based synchrony game intervention. I 
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used similar humanization measures to assess the participant’s impressions of the 
agent, as well as questions to assess trust and persuasiveness of the agent 
following the task.  
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 93 undergraduate students at the 
University of California, Santa Cruz, who each received course credit for 
participating. Of the original 107 participants, 14 were excluded from the 
analysis, due to equipment malfunction (n = 5), because they failed to follow the 
rhythm task instructions (n = 2), or because they said they were not fluent in 
English (n = 7). 
 Materials. The experiment took the form of a Python GUI for the 
experimental tasks and stimuli, followed by a Google Forms survey. Participants 
were provided with headphones and volume controls, and the computer was 
equipped with a Yeti Stereo Microphone for audio recording. The writing prompt 
participants were asked to respond to (in 3-5 sentences) was the following: “Do 
you think that a baker should be allowed to refuse to bake a wedding cake for a 
same-sex couple’s wedding when it violates the baker’s religious beliefs?” This 
question was selected to yield responses on both sides within our UC Santa Cruz 
participant pool, and encourage a sense of lively debate. 
 The Python GUI contained mid-task survey questions to follow the initial 
writing task (purportedly while the addressee was finishing their own response). 
This first mid-task survey included a question on true belief (to select an opposing 
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response). The addressee’s response was one of two pre-written responses (each 
101 words in length): 
Response 1. “No. I don’t think that bakers should have the right to 
deny service based solely on their own religious beliefs. Baking 
and selling the cake to a gay couple would cause no harm to the 
baker, and it’s not fair for the baker to blatantly discriminate and 
deny a couple a cake. Even if it’s their private business, it would 
still be discrimination to refuse service on the basis of sexuality. I 
believe that in the end, it is good for the economy and for the baker 
to sell to the couple, and the baker is receiving compensation for 
their product.”  
Response 2. “Yes. I think that bakers should have the right to deny 
service based on their own religious beliefs. Baking is a creative 
outlet, and therefore it is not up to the government to decide what 
kind of art a baker must create or who to sell it to. If it’s their 
private business, they should be able to sell to who they want to, 
and can reserve the right to refuse service to anyone. I believe that 
in the end, bakers need to be allowed to maintain their own 
personal, religious, and political beliefs, to run their business as 
they choose.” 
A second mid-task survey included questions to assess attention and belief 
change. Next, for the rhythm recording task, participants were provided with an 
egg shaker (A Latin Percussion LP004-GLO), which sat in a bright orange Solo 
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cup on the desk by the computer (for visibility). Participants were led to believe 
that these first 6 rhythms would be sent to their addressee, when in fact they were 
only for practice. The first 6 rhythm prompts asked participants to create a rhythm 
“that sounds like a heartbeat,” “that sounds like a rainstorm,” “that sounds like 
someone running up stairs,” “that sounds like a lullaby,” “that would fit into a 
horror movie,” or that “you would dance to,” in randomized order.  
The addressee’s recorded rhythms were created ahead of time, and were a 
combination of real human rhythm recording, and artificial repetition. In this way, 
the recordings were neither created by a human or a machine, but something in-
between. The original audio was recorded with the same equipment and lab booth 
that participants would be using, and then edited in Audacity such that every track 
started with 1 second of silence to start. After this, a repeated clip of 2 segments 
of audio (A and B) alternated ABAB until 10 seconds were up, at which point the 
audio recording would end abruptly. This was to create the illusion of spontaneity, 
while the repeated clips were designed to add credence to the notion that a 
machine learning algorithm might have produced the rhythm. Six such recordings 
were played two times through without a written prompt description (a total of 20 
seconds per recorded stimulus).  
The post-experimental survey was a Google Form, designed much the 
same as the previous two experiments. The first set of questions asked 
participants about the trust and persuasion of the addressee they interacted with on 
a Likert scale of 1-7, “Not at all” to “Very much so” (five questions on 
persuasion, five questions on trust, with one question from each set reverse-
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coded). The next set of questions asked participants to rate their addressee along 
the humanization scores used in Experiments 1 and 2, on the same scale as the 
first set of questions (adapted from Haslam, 2006). After that, there was another 
set of humanization questions that instead asked participants to rate the addressee 
from 1-7 as “Much less than average” to “Much more than average” (adapted 
from Schroeder et al., 2017).  
Next, participants were asked two questions about their experience with 
rhythms and egg-shakers, and two questions about experience with and enjoyment 
of debate. After this, participants were asked a series of questions to assess their 
attention to detail in understanding task instructions, followed by a reassessment 
of their belief on the topic of debate (with a long-answer option for elaboration). 
Participants then completed a self-assessment regarding effort in the task, and 
were asked a series of optional long-answer questions designed to prompt them to 
write about any issues or suspicions they may have had about the task.  
 Design. I used a 2 (“anonymous student participating in a different lab on 
another UC campus” or “machine-learning algorithm designed to communicate 
like a UC student”) x 2 (Synchrony “attempt to copy the rhythm as you hear it” or 
Non-Synchrony “play a response rhythm that is not the same”) between-subjects 
design. I looked primarily at the participant's humanization ratings of the 
addressee, trust and persuasion ratings of the addressee, as well belief change on 
the post-experimental survey. I assessed the participant's experience with rhythm 
and music, as well as with debate for potential post-hoc analyses. 
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 Procedure.  Participants were taken to a single-occupancy computer 
booth and were told that they would be interacting with either another student or a 
machine-learning algorithm about a political topic, followed by a rhythm activity. 
In actuality, the addressee was a collection of pre-recorded responses. The 
addressee’s debate response was designed to be in direct opposition to the 
participant's response on the first survey questions, following the initial writing 
task.  
 The procedure was as follows. First, participants saw the instructions for 
their particular condition to interact with another student, or to interact with a 
machine-learning algorithm. Then participants read the debate prompt, followed 
by a set of survey questions. Next, participants read the presumed addressee’s 
response, and completed another set of survey questions. Finally, participants 
completed the rhythm task, which consisted of a series of six rhythm instructions 
for the participant to interpret.  
The rationale behind interspersing survey questions within the task was 
two-fold. The questions both acted as filler tasks to add credibility to the deceit 
that another agent (human or machine) was taking time to respond to the 
experimental tasks. The questions also assessed information regarding the 
participant’s true belief (so they could be successfully matched to an opposing 
statement) as well as other important details. These questions asked whether they 
were arguing what they truly believed, whether the topic affects people in their 
life, whether they’ve debated that topic before, how they feel their addressee 
responded, whether they disagreed with that response, whether that response 
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made them more likely to want to interact with the addressee further, and 
reassessment of their own true belief following their addressee’s response. 
After the first six rhythm prompts, the participant was then asked to either 
synchronize with their addressee’s rhythm (played simultaneously as they 
recorded), or create a rhythm that was not the same as the one they heard (which 
did not play as they recorded if they were in the non-synchrony condition). This 
was repeated 6 times, where the recording they heard was a 10-second recording 
played two times through (20 seconds total). For the rhythm task, participants 
could opt to listen to the recorded stimuli or their own recorded audio as many 
times as they chose, allowing them to re-record as many times as they desired. 
When ready, they would submit their audio track and move on to the next 
instruction. Following each synchrony or non-synchrony recording, participants 
were asked how well they felt they followed the instruction (on a 1-5 scale).  
The synchrony and non-synchrony conditions differed based on whether 
people were moving together with the audio or in sequence with the audio. For 
the synchrony condition, it was important for the participants to move in 
synchrony with the audio, because if they were sequential, this behavior could be 
described as mimicry rather than synchrony. At the same time, for the non-
synchrony condition, it was important for the participants to not be producing 
rhythms together with the audio, because this may lead to people making similar 
or complementary rhythms as opposed to distinct rhythms. 
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After the completion of the debate and rhythm task, the participants were 
asked to fill out a final questionnaire regarding their addressee’s humanization 
characteristics, as well as perceived trust and persuasiveness of the addressee. 
Results 
 The following section presents analyses for an inter-rater reliability test on 
egg-shaker recordings, a humanization scale comparison, a look at participants 
who changed their beliefs early in the task, humanization and subscale 
comparison between groups, as well as confidence, trust, and persuasiveness 
group comparisons. 
 Synchrony task instructions. Before conducting the analysis, I asked 
three independent coders to go through and listen to all of the recordings 
produced by the participants, when they were asked to either match the rhythm of 
their addressee, or play a different rhythm. The coders were blind to the condition 
of each set of audio recordings, and made a decision about whether it seemed the 
participant was generally trying to match, or not match the original audio 
recording stimuli. The consensus scores were compared between all three coders, 
and there was a high level of agreement (K = .89, p < .001 between raters 1 and 2; 
K = .94, p < .001 between raters 2 and 3; K = .91, p < .001 between raters 3 and 
1). Participants who failed to follow instructions were excluded from the 
following analyses. 
 Humanization Scale. In order to validate the scale I have been using up to 
this point (in Experiments 1 and 2), I performed a bivariate correlation between 
results from my own humanization scale (adapted from Haslam, 2006) and the 
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other version (as reported in Shroeder et al, 2017). For each, I combined all 
humanization scores into one measure comprising positive and negative qualities 
for both Human Nature and Human Uniqueness subscales. Both scales resulted in 
similar overall averages, with my adaptation of the scale performing similarly (M 
= 3.63, SD = 0.52) to the other version of the humanization scale (M = 3.53, SD = 
0.45), r = .38, p < .001. Given that these scales were highly correlated, for the 
sake of simplicity I discuss results from my own humanization scale for the 
following analyses. 
Unclear or Changed Beliefs. A total of 20 participants expressed that 
their belief in their own response to the debate prompt was unclear, and that they 
found their addressee’s response convincing, and even changed their mind before 
participating in the rhythm task. Initially, 35 (37.6%) participants answered “Yes” 
and 58 (62.4%) responded “No” to the question “Do you think that a baker should 
be allowed to refuse to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple’s wedding 
when it violates the baker’s religious beliefs?” Of the 35 who responded “Yes,” 
11 (31.4%) were unclear on their belief. Fewer of those who responded “No” 
ended up being unclear on their belief, with just 9 of the initial 58 (15.5%) 
displaying uncertainty and subsequently changing their response. In order to 
determine whether to exclude these participants from the analysis, I conducted an 
independent samples t-test for overall humanization scores. I found no significant 
difference between participants with unclear or changed beliefs (M = 3.44, SD = 
0.55, 95%CI = [3.21, 3.66], n = 20) and participants who had clear and fixed 
beliefs (M = 3.68, SD = 0.5, 95%CI = [3.57, 3.8], n = 73), t(91) = -1.93, p = .06, 
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95%CI = [-0.01, 0.51]. For this reason, these participants were included in the 
following analyses.  
 Humanization Main Effects. For combined humanization scores, main 
effects were observed for both backstory, but not for synchrony. Participants who 
thought they were interacting with a human (another student), they rated their 
addressee more highly on combined humanization (M = 3.73, SD = 0.51, 95%CI 
= [3.59, 3.88]) than participants who thought they were interacting with a 
computer (machine learning algorithm), (M = 3.52, SD = 0.51, 95%CI = [3.36, 
3.67]), F(1, 89) = 4.27, p = .04. While non-significant, participants who engaged 
in synchrony also gave slightly higher combined humanization ratings to their 
addressee (M = 3.71, SD = 0.51, 95%CI = [3.57, 3.86]) than participants who did 
not, (M = 3.54, SD = 0.51, 95%CI = [3.39, 3.69]), F(1, 89) = 2.74, p = .1. 
 Human Nature and Human Uniqueness. To better understand the group 
differences in humanization, I examined the effect of backstory and synchrony on 
positive and negative Human Nature and Human Uniqueness ratings of the 
addressee. Of these, a significant main effect was found for negative Human 
Nature traits, and a significant interaction effect was found for positive Human 
Uniqueness traits. For negative ratings of Human Nature, when participants were 
told they were interacting with another student, they rated their addressee more 
highly for negative traits (M = 3.26, SD = 3.26, 95%CI = [2.98, 3.55]) than when 
they were told they were interacting with an algorithm, (M = 2.7, SD = 2.71, 
95%CI = [2.41, 3]), F(1, 89) = 7.42, p = .008.  
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 As for interaction effects, when participants were told they were 
interacting with another student, they rated their addressee more highly on 
positive Human Uniqueness qualities when they synchronized in the rhythm 
activity (M = 4.22, SD = 0.79, 95%CI = [3.89, 4.55]) than when they were asked 
to make a different rhythm (M = 3.78, SD = 0.87, 95%CI = [3.44, 4.13]). 
Conversely, when participants were told they were interacting with an algorithm, 
they tended to rate their addressee less highly on positive Human Uniqueness 
qualities when they synchronized in the rhythm activity (M = 4.01, SD = 0.85, 
95%CI = [3.67, 4.35]) than when they were asked to make a different rhythm (M 
= 4.32, SD = 0.82, 95%CI = [3.97, 4.67]), F(1, 89) = 4.75, p = .03. 
 Confidence. In a comparison of self-reported confidence, following each 
rhythm recording, Participants in the synchrony group reported lower confidence 
in their ability to follow instructions (M = 3.93, SD = 0.53, 95%CI = [3.78, 4.08]) 
than those in the non-synchrony group (M = 4.57, SD = 0.53, 95%CI = [4.41, 
4.73]),  F(1, 89) = 33.7, p < .001. There were no other significant differences 
between groups. 
Trust of Addressee. While I expected to observe higher ratings of trust 
for participants who were told their partner was human, and for participants who 
engaged in a synchrony task, no significant group differences were observed, F(1, 
89) = 4.27, p = .04. 
 Persuasiveness of Addressee. Although there were no observed 
differences in self-reported trust of the addressee, there was a significant 
interaction effect for persuasiveness. When participants were told they were 
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interacting with another student, they rated their addressee more highly for 
persuasiveness when they synchronized in the rhythm activity (M = 3.27, SD = 
0.95, 95%CI = [2.84, 3.7]) than when they were asked to make a different rhythm 
(M = 2.57, SD = 1.36, 95%CI = [2.13, 3.02]). Conversely, when participants were 
told they were interacting with an algorithm, they rated their addressee less highly 
for persuasiveness when they synchronized in the rhythm activity (M = 2.94, SD = 
1.05, 95%CI = [2.49, 3.39]) than when they were asked to make a different 
rhythm (M = 3.63, SD = 0.90, 95%CI = [3.17, 4.09]), F(1, 89) = 9.56, p = .003. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 3 included the same humanization measure as in previous 
experiments, but also compared another version of this scale, implications of 
belief change, group differences in humanization of the anonymous agent, 
confidence in synchrony, and finally the trust and persuasion findings. 
 Humanization Scale. There were various reasons I opted to use my own 
adaptation of Haslam’s (2006) humanization scale. One reason was for 
consistency, in order to do comparisons across Experiments 1, 2, and 3 more 
easily. Another reason was the one stated in the results: namely, that the two 
scales were highly correlated and did not seem to differ in central tendency.  
The final reason has more to do with the context of the research, in an 
human-computer interactions study. In the other adaptation of the scale 
(Schroeder et al., 2017), the questions are set up to ask people to compare their 
addressee to others in a way that doesn’t make a lot of sense in a context where 
you are judging the behavior of a machine. One participant, who happened to be 
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in the human backstory and synchrony group, said: “I didn't really understand the 
questions where the answers were ‘more than average, less than average’ so I 
might have answered in a way that isn't reflective of what I think because I was 
kind of confused by the answer choices in relation to the question. I'm not sure if 
the answers I chose represent what I meant to say or choose.” Because there 
seemed to be confusion with this style of question, and because the scales seemed 
to be correlated strongly enough, I opted to focus my analysis on the version I had 
been using previously. 
 Unclear or Changed Beliefs.  Interestingly, approximately 21% of 
participants changed their minds after reading their partner’s response to the 
debate question, even before engaging in the synchrony activity. Because it would 
appear that these participants who changed their minds after the initial exposure to 
the opposing belief did not significantly differ in their overall humanization rating 
of the addressee, they were not excluded from the analysis. 
 Looking at the directions in changed beliefs, more students (62.4%) 
initially responded with a “No” to the forced-choice question “Do you think that a 
baker should be allowed to refuse to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple’s 
wedding when it violates the baker’s religious beliefs?” These same students 
tended to also be more resolute in their beliefs (with 84.5% not changing their 
minds). In the post-experimental survey, when I asked what students thought the 
study was about, one replied “I guess the connection between following a rhythm 
and homophobia?” It would appear that this pattern of responses may have more 
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to do with the political climate at UCSC than anything else, as one belief was 
more popular. 
In my initial design, I wanted to make sure that it would be believable to 
receive an opposing response, and not make the participant doubt the validity of 
their partner’s existence. Although it would have been ideal to have a 50-50 split, 
no students expressed disbelief about their addressee’s existence on the basis of 
making an unusual argument. By setting participants up with an opposing 
viewpoint to read, I was hoping to set the groundwork for initial dehumanization 
of the addressee, in order to establish a clear intervention strategy through the use 
of backstories and synchrony. Still, it is perhaps a testament to the utility of these 
strategies that even participants who initially agree can begin to humanize their 
addressee to a greater extent.  
It also goes to show that beliefs are not fixed, and even interactions with 
anonymous strangers (human or machine) can lead to belief change. That said, if 
this methodology is to be improved upon, I would recommend the use of multiple 
debate prompts, followed by a survey designed to assess which beliefs are 
strongest, in order to match each participant up with a debate response with which 
they are less inclined to agree. 
 Humanization and Confidence. Even while interacting with an 
anonymous addressee, just being told that it was another UC student (human) or a 
machine learning algorithm (computer) was enough to affect overall 
humanization scores. In reading survey responses, it’s apparent that participants 
began to draw inferences about their addressee, based on backstory alone.  
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 Participants in the human backstory group, for example, said the following 
things when making inferences about their addressee: “Their knowledgable [sic] 
in the subject, and passionate about their beliefs. They seem to be creative based 
on their rhythm making” and “I can infer that he/she is creative and has a clear 
understanding of politics.”  
 On the other hand, participants in the computer backstory group said the 
following: “It felt a little computerized” and “They seem to use logic in their 
arguments, instead of emotions.” It is worth re-emphasizing that the stimuli 
produced by their so-called addressee were the same across conditions (the only 
difference being the pro/con argument, which did not vary systematically by 
condition).  
 Participants were clearly more confident about their ability to follow 
instructions in the non-synchrony condition, which might be part of the reason 
that synchrony effects, while trending, were not significant. One participant in the 
computer backstory and synchrony condition said, “it was hard to copy its rhythm 
exactly.” Synchrony may have boosted the perception of an anonymous 
addressee’s humanlike qualities, but perhaps in a more stressful way than was 
intended. It is possible that the stress of participating in a synchrony task that 
required too much effort may have reduced any possible benefits that a rhythm-
based activity might otherwise offer. 
There was one main effect for a humanization subscale. For negative 
Human Nature traits (rating the addressee as jealous, nervous, impatient, 
distractible, and aggressive), the supposedly human agent received higher scores 
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than the computer agent. Between Human Nature and Human Uniqueness, the 
former is related more to animalistic characteristics, and the latter is related to 
more mechanistic characteristics. Given that humans are more like an animal than 
computers are, it makes a certain amount of sense that Human Nature scores, even 
for negative traits, would be higher for human rather than machine agents. 
There was also an interaction effect for positive Human Uniqueness traits 
(rating the addressee as humble, thorough, organized, polite, and broadminded). 
Participants who synchronized with a supposedly human agent gave higher 
ratings for these traits than those who didn’t synchronize, and participants who 
synchronized with a supposedly computer agent tended to give lower ratings for 
these traits than those who didn’t synchronize. The reason for this interaction 
effect is unclear. It is possible that participants appreciate certain mechanistic 
qualities of a human they are trying to synchronize with (in a rather challenging 
rhythm-matching task), but also value a computer agent to a greater extent when 
they are not asked to copy what they may interpret as boring and mechanistic 
actions, or in some way made to compare themselves to a supposedly machine 
agent. 
Trust and Persuasiveness of Addressee. For ratings of trust, it is 
possible that participants were less keen to respond to questions in the survey that 
might cast their addressee in a disparaging light (possibly even for the computer 
agent). In some of the written survey responses, participants who interacted with a 
supposedly human agent offered reserved responses such as: “The addressee is a 
person who has an opinion and shared a response” and “I did feel a little self 
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conscious answering the survey, like I was worried about what my partner was 
saying about me.” Meanwhile, participants who interacted with a supposedly 
machine agent responded in a similar manner, with comments such as: “They are 
an AI that can use collected information to seem more human” and “it has learned 
an array of different rhythms and cadences.” 
As for persuasiveness, participants gave higher ratings to humans they 
synchronized with, and machines they did not synchronize with. As discussed 
previously, the reason for this is unclear. Synchrony and humanness were 
expected to lead to higher persuasiveness ratings, but the fact that non-synchrony 
in computer agents would lead to higher persuasiveness ratings than synchrony in 
computer agents is puzzling. Again, it is possible that people simply do not enjoy 
being asked to perform the same job as a machine. Even beyond being unsettled 
by machines that are supposedly taking human jobs, being saddled with a 
machine’s job can lead to a certain degree of resentment. If a person is asked to 
synchronize with a machine, they may develop a dislike for that agent, and 
therefore feel less willing to change their initial beliefs in order to find common 
ground with that machine. It is also possible that robots that are viewed more 
mechanistically (recall that Human Uniqueness followed a similar pattern to 
persuasiveness ratings for the four groups) are also potentially viewed as more 
impartial, and therefore may have more persuasive arguments (even if the agents 
themselves are no more trustworthy) 
In the next, and final analysis, I will do a cross-experimental comparison 
of humanization scores. This comparison is exploratory in nature, and is provided 
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for the benefit of the reader. It is quite likely that further development of a 
measure is warranted, for use in the development of likeable machine agents in 
various social contexts. 
Cross-Experimental Comparison of Humanization Scores 
In this section, I outline a cross-experimental comparison of all conditions 
from Experiments 1, 2, and 3. This analysis made use of pre-existing data from all 
experiments up to this point. There was no overarching hypotheses, as this 
analysis was primarily conducted for exploratory purposes, in hopes of informing 
the use of scales similar to that of Haslam’s (2006) humanization measure in the 
context of human-computer and human-robot interaction.  
Results 
 Significant group differences were observed between experimental 
conditions, F(9, 344) = 23.06, p < .001 (Figure 4). Of particular note, all groups 
from Experiment 1 rated the depictions of robots significantly more highly on 
humanization traits than both robot groups from Experiment 2. Additionally, they 
also rated the depictions of robots more highly on humanization traits than both 
machine agent groups from Experiment 3. Both TheraBot groups also rated 
machine agents more highly than both human agent groups from Experiment 3. 
The RoboShrink before mimicry group also rated the machine agent more highly 
than the human non-synchrony group in Experiment 3, while the TheraBot after 
mimicry group rated the machine agent more highly than the RoboShrink before 
mimicry group.  The human-synchrony group from Experiment 3 received higher 
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humanization scores, however, than the non-synchronous robot condition from 
Experiment 2.  
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Cross-experimental comparison of humanization scores, from left to 
right: 1.1 (RoboShrink before mimicry), 1.2 (TheraBot before mimicry), 1.3 
(RoboShrink after mimicry), 1.4 (TherabBot after mimicry), 2.1 (Synchrony with 
Mabu), 2.2 (Non-synchrony with Mabu), 3.1 (Human and synchrony), 3.2 
(Human and non-synchrony), 3.3 (Algorithm and synchrony), 3.4 (Algorithm and 
non-synchrony). 
 
Discussion 
 While this cross-experimental comparison of humanization scores is 
exploratory, it is still interesting to consider what it can tell us about the 
humanization measure itself. Overall, Experiment 1 had the highest ratings of 
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humanization of all 3 experiments (consistently higher than the actual, physical 
robots in Experiment 2, and higher than both machine groups from Experiment 3).  
General Discussion 
When it comes to interactions with other humans, perceiving another 
person as different from oneself or the group can sometimes result in the 
perception that an individual is somehow less than human (Haslam, 2006; Haslam 
& Loughnan, 2014). In some cases, this can result in something as extreme as 
animalistic or mechanistic dehumanization, when fundamental traits of human 
uniqueness or nature, respectively, are denied (Crawford, Modri, & Motyl, 2013). 
There is converging evidence that similarity attraction is also at play in human-
computer interactions, with people preferring machine agents who display 
characteristics that are more human or more well-matched to their own 
personality characteristics (Nass & Brave, 2005). As computer-mediated 
communication becomes increasingly common, and the boundaries between 
human and machine interactions become increasingly unclear, it is important to 
assess in which ways these humanization measurements may also apply to non-
human agents.  
         Other research suggests that there are some possible motion synchrony 
activities that can induce a sense of kinship and trust between strangers 
(Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). While some research has implied that the same may 
be true of human-robot interactions, this research has been observational and not 
entirely generalizable (Michalowski, Sabanovic, & Kozima, 2007; Michalowski, 
Simmons, & Kozima, 2009). My research works to bridge this gap in 
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understanding, in terms of the humanizing impacts of motion synchrony in 
human-computer and human-robot interactions. 
Experiment Review 
 In three experiments involving human-computer interactions with non-
human virtual agents, I investigated the impact of synchrony exercises on 
humanization trait ratings. Each experiment had a focus on some element of 
health. Experiment 1 involved training non-human agents to correctly assess 
mental health, while Experiment 2 involved the use of a robot motivational 
coaches for physical health, and Experiment 3 had participants debating human or 
non-human agents online in the context of healthy interpersonal behaviors over 
the internet. The three experiments were designed to be successively more true to 
real-life human-computer interactions, with Experiment 1 using static robot 
depictions, Experiment 2 using functional robots that can move, and Experiment 3 
simulating an online, text-based conversation with an anonymous agent (either 
human or machine). 
 In this research, I was seeking to test three main hypotheses, related to 
humanization, synchrony, and backstories: (1) that a humanization measure 
(adapted from Haslam, 2006) can be used in human-computer and human-robot 
interaction studies; (2) that behavioral matching, or synchrony, can lead to higher 
humanization ratings for machine agents, as well as human agents; (3) that while 
humans will receive higher humanization ratings than robots that perform the 
same actions, collaborative synchrony will boost humanization ratings for all 
agents. 
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Experiment 1 provides novel evidence that humanization scales may be 
used as a measure of impression change after a behavioral matching task 
intervention (mimicry training). Humanization ratings were found to correspond 
to preference for one robot over another, and participating in the optional mimicry 
task resulted in higher humanization scores for TheraBot (the helper bot), but not 
for RoboShrink (the replacement bot). Results from Experiment 1 indicate that a 
mimicry task can lead to improvements in the humanization ratings of a robot that 
is presented as a helper rather than replacement robot. Both RoboShrink and 
TheraBot received higher overall scores for Human Uniqueness traits than Human 
Nature traits (both positive and negative items), which corresponds to more 
mechanistic than animalistic impressions (rightly so, given that both were 
presented as robots).  
In Experiment 2, participants overwhelmingly preferred to respond 
positively to the robot. When given the option, they usually selected one of the 
two positive and affirmative responses (Positive–Warm or Positive–Cold). The 
synchrony motion activity did have an impact in how participants chose to 
respond to the robot directly, with warmer responses during and following the 
synchrony activity than without a synchrony activity. People who participated in 
the motion synchrony task and performed the stretching exercises while the robot 
moved along with them tended to respond more warmly to the robot following the 
activity than participants who only heard the robot giving them directions on 
which stretches to perform. Humanization ratings and memory did not vary across 
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conditions. People rated robots they moved in- and out-of-synch with similarly. 
They also remembered information about the robots similarly. 
In Experiment 3, participants were led to believe they were interacting 
with a human or machine agent who disagreed with them on a topic of political 
debate. Next, they were asked to perform a synchronous or non-synchronous 
motion activity with an egg-shaker. Anonymous agents with a human backstory 
received higher humanization scores overall. Interestingly, while synchrony led to 
higher ratings for humanization for human agents, participants gave higher ratings 
of positive Human Uniqueness to machines that they did not synchronize with. 
The human synchrony condition also led to higher perceived persuasiveness in an 
agent than human non-synchrony, but machine synchrony led to lower perceived 
persuasiveness in an agent than non-synchrony. Taken together, it seems clear 
that backstories and synchrony interventions can affect not only the perceived 
humanness of an agent, but also the persuasiveness of that agent. There is also 
some indication that machine agents would be best advised to encourage creative 
interactions, rather than repetitive copy-cat interactions, in order to be considered 
more persuasive and humanlike (if that is the goal). 
Cross-Experiment Humanization Comparison 
In a cross-experimental comparison of all the groups from each of these 
three experiments, there appeared to be certain differences between how student 
participants rated the agent they interacted with on overall humanization. For 
example, the illustrated depictions of robots in Experiment 1 (with the exception 
of RoboShrink following the mimicry task) all received higher humanization 
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scores than the two robot conditions from Experiment 2. Both TheraBot 
conditions also outperformed all but the human-synchrony agent from Experiment 
3 (which in turn received higher humanization than the non-synchronous robot in 
Experiment 2).  
It is hard to say for certain, but it could be that students studying 
Psychology may have been particularly drawn to the idea of working to train 
robots that were designed to aid in providing therapy to those who need it. The 
mental health aspect of the robot’s purpose may have resonated with them to such 
an extent that they began to humanize the robots, almost as in-group members. 
Looking at existing research, there is reason to believe that, in some cases, 
more impoverished machine agents can lead to more positive judgements (Lee, 
2010; Nowak & Biocca, 2004). This could in part have something to do with the 
uncanny valley hypothesis, which suggests that machine agents can benefit from 
similarity to humans, up to the point at which they become unsettling (Mori, 
MacDorman, & Kageki, 2012). The fact that all of the experimental groups in 
Experiment 1 gave higher humanization scores to the drawings of robots – 
compared to not only the robots of Experiment 2, but also the machine agents of 
Experiment 3 – implies that perhaps the impoverished image is a safer bet for 
human-computer interactions. 
It could also be that people are more accustomed to interfacing with 
cartoons and illustrated depictions of robots in the media. This familiarity could in 
turn lead to a sense of comfort and work to boost the perceived humanization of 
the robot agents. Whereas in Experiment 2, while the robots were quite popular 
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with participants, the presence of physical robots can still be seen as threatening 
to some. As for Experiment 3, participants were interacting with an anonymous 
other. The drawings of cute robots could simply pose less of a threat. 
Conclusions 
The driving question in this research was whether people can develop 
more positive impressions (higher humanization scores) for nonhuman and human 
agents alike when they are asked to engage in a motion synchrony task with these 
agents. This research lends support to the use of the collaborative synchrony in 
fostering positive intergroup relations (for example, in visual communication such 
as sign language and gestures, and musical or rhythm-based games). While it is as 
yet unclear exactly what the effects of motion synchrony are on the perception of 
machine agents, these experiments reveal that non-threatening machine agents can 
benefit from engaging users in motion-based interaction tasks, both in terms of 
humanization score improvements (as seen in Experiment 1) and in terms of 
warmer user responses (as seen in Experiment 2). 
When it comes to agents that are potentially seen as outgroup members, 
synchrony can lead to improvements in humanization ratings for machine and 
human agents alike, but machine agents are more persuasive when users are not 
asked to engage with them in a rhythm-based motion synchrony task (as seen in 
Experiment 3). One possible interpretation is that people place greater credence in 
the behaviors of a machine when they are not asked to engage with it repetitively, 
but creatively. Another interpretation is that people place higher confidence in 
machines that appear distant, and therefore impartial. Feeling less of a bond with 
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the machine (that is, not participating in a synchrony task), could lead to a sense 
that the machine is more logical. For example, in Experiment 1, RoboShrink more 
often misled participants who favored that machine design. It is possible that 
RoboShrink was more persuasive precisely because it was seen as machine-like, 
logical, and impartial.  
Also in Experiment 1, participants that opted to train the first robot they 
were introduced to tended to rate TheraBot more highly after the mimicry task, 
while the same was not true for those that trained RoboShrink. It is possible that 
emotionally distant and threatening machine agents don’t benefit from a 
synchrony activity to the same extent as endearing robots that do not pose a 
threat. The machine agent in Experiment 3, set up initially to disagree with the 
participant, could still be seen as enough of a threat that a participant becomes 
hyper-aware of the machine’s negative qualities when asked to synchronize with 
it. Regardless of interpretation, it is clear that synchrony has a different impact on 
the perceived persuasiveness of machines than humans.  
In conclusion, these experiments revealed the following: (1) There is some 
information that can be captured about a participant’s feelings towards a machine 
or supposedly human agent, through the use of a humanization measure (adapted 
from Haslam, 2006). It is important to bear in mind that even the negative traits 
on the scale are important aspects of what it is to be human, and should not be dis-
included in the final analysis. (2) Motion synchrony can indeed contribute to 
higher humanization ratings for supposedly human, as well as machine agents. 
However, in certain circumstances, when interacting with a physical robot (as in 
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Experiment 2), synchrony interventions seem to have less of an effect on 
perceived humanness of that agent. (3) The perceived humanness of an agent 
(backstory) does impact their humanization scores, but collaborative synchrony 
can also boost these scores, mostly for human agents (as in Experiment 3).  
Through this research, I sought to better understand how to encourage 
positive interactions between groups that have effectively dehumanized one 
another, perhaps due to a fear that the other group poses a threat to their well-
being (For example, a threat to their job security). Studying the interactions of 
humans and machines can have a beneficial impact on human-human interaction 
too: we can come to a better understanding of how to interact with those who are 
dehumanized, or seen as belonging to an outgroup. If synchrony-boosting 
exercises can help break down self-other distinctions, perhaps this will result in 
more positive interactions and less stigma between people.  
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